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EDITORIAL

THE DOCTRINE OF CHARITY

IN *Agape and Eros** Dr. Nygren, Professor of Systematic Theology in the University of Lund, Sweden, has given us a book of great importance; and the fact that it has been admirably translated, and is inexpensive, brings it within the reach of all. It is certainly a book which all should read. So far as we know, it is the only book in English which provides a systematic and objective examination of the highest term in the Christian vocabulary. Dr. Scholz's German work, reviewed elsewhere in this number, was an earlier essay on the same subject; and the appearance of the two books in such close succession may be regarded as an indication of how long some such studies have been overdue. In this field, more almost than in any other of Christian theology, we have had plenty of rhetoric but very little definition; and it is the great merit of these books that definition is their aim. For the same reason we shall endeavour to give as careful a description of Dr. Nygren's book as possible, before passing (as we shall feel bound to pass) to criticism.

Dr. Nygren's main contention is that *Agape* and *Eros* represent two directly antithetic ideas. Both are commonly translated by the English word "love"; though the word "charity" used in the A.V. of 1 Cor. xiii., and hence popularized in English speech, was and is a valuable reminder of what Latin thought had already expressed by its use of *caritas*, viz., that there was something unusual and *sui generis* in *Agape*. In his second chapter, entitled "Agape and the Gospel: the New Way of Fellowship with God," Dr. Nygren lays bare what this "something" was. It was the wholly paradoxical love of God revealed in the teaching, life, and death of Jesus Christ. It was wholly paradoxical, because it was spontaneous and uncaused. It recognized no work in man beyond what it created in him. The notion of "the infinite value of the human soul" is as foreign

* *Agape and Eros*. A Study of the Christian Idea of Love. Part I. By Anders Nygren. Authorized Translation by A. G. Hebert, M.A., S.S.M. S.P.C.K. 6s. net.

to the Gospel as the Jewish idea that the Jew, by his knowledge and practice of the Law, had a special title to God's love. On the contrary, man has no title at all; and the claim of religious privilege is the completest of all travesties of the truth. This point is forcibly illustrated from the parables. Not only the most difficult, such as the parable of the Labourers, but also the simplest, such as that of the Sower, are shown to be pregnant with this truth. For the point of this parable lies in the action of the Sower. What kind of Sower is he who sows his seed broadcast, on the stones and paths and amid thorns no less than on good soil? Had he been too idle to clean his fields? Or was he half-blind? No: he represented the prodigality of the love of God, offered without favour to all, even publicans and sinners, in the person of Jesus, the Messiah. No wonder that His disciples were described a few years later as "they that have turned the world upside down." Human values were indeed radically reversed by the invasion of this new Lover.

A like conception permeates the teaching of St. Paul; with this difference, that for him the love of God is supremely gathered up into, and embodied in, the Cross. Dr. Nygren understands St. Paul's doctrine of the Atonement much in the same way as Dr. Aulén: the clue lies in the sentence, "God was in Christ reconciling the world unto himself." The Cross is the great manifestation of *Agape*. And this *Agape* is imparted to the believer, not in the sense that he responds with a like *Agape* to God—the Pauline word for man's response is "faith"—but that the believer reflects the divine *Agape* which he has himself received in the attitude he adopts towards his neighbour. So far from being independent of Christian faith, the love of neighbours which Christianity teaches cannot exist without it; for it is God's own love energizing in the disciples. The way is thus prepared both for that hymn to *Agape* which we have in 1 Cor. xiii., and which (with Reitzenstein) Dr. Nygren interprets as a challenge to the claims of *Gnosis*; and also for that dogmatic formulation which St. John gave to the idea in the sentence, "God is love."

Dr. Nygren's treatment of the Johannine evidence is of particular interest; for he finds there not only the most comprehensive exposition of *Agape*, but also a certain "doubleness" or tendency to compromise, which he thinks marked a declension from the first purity of the authentic Christian idea. He detects this in the "metaphysic" of the Son's relation to the Father, as the eternally worthy Object of the Father's love, which prevents the latter being "uncaused"; in the allusions to the disciples'

love for their Lord as a ground of God's love for them; in the exclusive *nuance* of such a phrase as "love of the brethren"; and in the way in which love for God and love for the world are contrasted, as though *Agape* were in any sense determined by its object. We make no comment now on these misgivings about St. John, but will content ourselves with drawing attention to them as a sign-post. They indicate the point at which we shall make bold to join issue with our author.

Chapters V. and VI. are concerned with *Agape's* rival and antithesis, *Eros*, and particularly with the ideas of it which inform the philosophies of Plato, Aristotle, and Plotinus. The fundamental feature of *Eros* is that it is the love of desire—spiritual and exalted desire, at least in the best Greek thought, but still essentially ego-centric and concupiscent. It is the Will-to-have—to have Beauty, Goodness, and Truth, and to have it for one's own satisfaction. "Eros is the way of man to the Divine, and can never be a way of which the Divine may descend to man." So Plato taught in the *Symposium* and the *Phædrus*: and closely bound up with it is the whole Orphic philosophy, for which the body is a tomb and the soul's destiny to escape to the supra-sensible world. This doctrine of *Eros*, which in Plato was a Doctrine of Man, was developed by Aristotle and given a much more universal range, becoming central to his whole metaphysic. In the words *κινεῖ ὡς ἐρώμενον* Aristotle seeks to explain how the "Pure Form" is the source of all motion: it draws all things by a process of attraction. The Platonic *Eros* has thus become "exalted to become the driving-force of the universe." And, correspondingly, the ladder, which Plato had used as a metaphor for the soul's ascent to the world of the Ideas, becomes in Aristotle a real Ladder of Existence, marking the upward stages by which the whole process of the world's movement strives to ascend to the One. Yet a further development is found when we come to Plotinus, the Neo-Platonist. For here we have to do not only with an ascent of all things to God, but also with a descent of all things from the One. Plotinus took this doctrine of the double process—the descent and the ascent or return—from the Alexandrian world-scheme which had come to dominate philosophy. Yet this descent of which he speaks is something far removed from the *Agape* of God in Christianity. It signifies a cosmic, not a redemptive, process; so far from being a spontaneous outflow of divine love, the descent is rather a figure to represent the fall of the soul into the sensible world; and, though Plotinus can say "God is Eros," he is careful to add that this means *αὐτοῦ ἔρως*—i.e., Self-Love.

In a final chapter Dr. Nygren sums up the essential contrast between *Agape* and *Eros*. *Eros* is ego-centric; upward-striving desire of man for God; evoked by the worth of the object of desire; seeking immortality; seeking "its own." *Agape* is theo-centric, being always ultimately God's own love; downward-thrusting in love towards all; spontaneous and uncaused; not seeking immortality, but believing in God's gracious act of resurrection; seeking not its own things. *Eros* is man's way to God; *Agape* is God's way to man; *Eros* is man's achievement; *Agape* is God's gift to man in Christ, and through Christ's people to the world. The two conceptions are the *fulcra* of religious and ethical systems which are poles apart. Only by a disastrous confusion could they be thought to have any kinship one with the other.

Enough has been said to show that Dr. Nygren's book fills a real gap in Christian theology, and a gap which has great dogmatic significance. For the conception which he is studying, though not strictly dogma, is the presupposition of the whole dogmatic structure of the Faith; and in clarifying issues here, and forcing matters to a decision, he is laying the whole Church under his debt. At the same time, this very fact requires us to look where we are being led; and the present writer at any rate cannot refrain from certain questionings. It must, of course, be observed that the volume before us is only Part I. of a larger work; and therefore such criticisms as we feel impelled to make now may prove to be forestalled when the promised sequel appears. Yet the issues raised are of sufficient importance to call for candid consideration.

The question which we have found pressing itself insistently upon us, as we read this book, is whether the starkness of the contrast between *Agape* and *Eros* is not overstated. We do not mean that we quarrel with the definition of either term: what we doubt is whether, when thus defined and disentangled, they baffle synthesis as completely as our author claims. As against the sentimental and unworthy compromises which have often prevailed, and have caused the salt of Christian charity to lose its savour, this essay constitutes a convincing testimony to the truth; and therein it is fulfilling the highest function of Protestantism. But that *Eros*, which symbolizes all that we mean by human idealism in thought, conduct, and art, admits of no reconciliation with *Agape*; that its best fruits are from the standpoint of the Gospel no more than *splendida vitia*, and Aristotle but the rubbish of an Adam; that man's desire for

God can find no trysting-place with God's love for man—all this involves a very sharp departure from those habits of thought, at once Catholic and liberal, which constitute so large a part of our Anglican heritage. The synthetic temper which permeated Westcott's work; the conception of the "*Præparatio Evangelica*" which formed the subject of Bishop Talbot's essay in *Lux Mundi*; the outlook which governs Dr. Kirk's recent volume of Bampton Lectures—these things are part and parcel of our education. And they have, of course, a long and continuous history behind them. It is not a question simply of going back to the Catholic mystics of the fifteenth century, or to the great scholastic synthesis which preceded them. Nor can we stop at Augustine, and say that here, most tragically, the evil days of compromise began: the Alexandrian school had long since sought to come to terms with Greek philosophy, and before their time Justin had spoken of Plato as "Moses in Greek." The truth is—and Dr. Nygren is aware of it—that the tradition goes back to the New Testament itself. It is undisguised in the writings of that very Evangelist who first wrote that "God is love." And must we not also say—though our author would, no doubt, challenge us—that even St. Paul found in contemporary Stoicism some ideas and figures which he felt to be allied to the Gospel?

And we believe that the human, ego-centric, desire for God is, in point of fact, indispensable to the operation of God's love (*Agape*) in this world of ours. "First that which is natural: afterward that which is spiritual"—the truth contained in this sentence is vital to all rational religion. Supernature cannot dispense with nature, nor grace with free-will. Rather the dogma of the Incarnation means that the natural is not discarded nor superseded by the spiritual, but taken up into it, redeemed. And the fact that man at his worst is redeemable does not mean that man at his best is irredeemable: though man's righteousness counts as no merit for salvation, yet it is not a positive bar to it. Even a good man may repent. Nay more, we will go so far as to say that it is just man's goodness, just his desire for God, just his *Eros* in short, which leads a man, whether good or bad, to repentance. "The sense of need," writes Dr. Nygren, "is an indispensable element in *Eros*; it is this that sets in motion the love of desire." And is it not also this which prompted the following:

Like as the hart desireth the water-brooks: so longeth my soul after thee, O God. My soul is athirst for God, yea, even for the living God: when shall I come to appear before the presence of God?

And this:

O how amiable are thy dwellings: thou Lord of hosts! My soul hath a desire and longing to enter into the courts of the Lord: my heart and my flesh rejoice in the living God.

And this:

Blessed are they which do hunger and thirst after righteousness: for they shall be filled. Blessed are the pure in heart: for they shall see God.

Yes, and this:

My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?

It is significant that the Old Testament finds virtually no place in Dr. Nygren's study. The omission means that his treatment of *Agape*—not least on the lexicographical side—is shorn of an important element. But we believe that even in regard to *Eros* also the Old Testament has valuable light to throw.

Our contention, then, is that, justified as our author is in setting the fully developed *Eros* in sharp contrast to the Christian *Agape*, there is yet a root in *Eros* which is indispensable to the very existence of the Christian religion. If that plea be refused, then Christianity must return upon itself and be content to continue as what Troeltsch called a "sect-type" of religion. If, on the other hand, it be allowed, then the way is open for the Church, strengthened by a fresh vision of the divine love—and Dr. Nygren's book gives us such a vision—to go on to make such terms with the life of the world, and with its philosophical, ethical, and artistic activities, as shall make Christendom once again a reality and re-assert Christ's sovereignty in human affairs.

THE BLESSED TRINITY*

St. Matt. xxviii. 19: "Go ye . . . and make disciples of all nations, baptizing them into the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit."

I

It is often questioned whether these words were really spoken by our Lord: but in any case it is certain that they represent the faith and practice of the Church from very early days. Much discussion centred round these articles of faith, and eventually the Church developed a set of technical terms in which to sum up the truths which she held. There are three Beings ("Hypostases" or Realities, as the Greeks said; "Personæ," as was said in the Latin West); and they are all of one Substance or Essence. Three Realities which form one Reality. One Divine Essence manifesting itself for ever in three directions, in three different rôles or characters.

Such language is difficult except to the philosopher, and even to him it is vague and obscure. But may I remind you shortly of certain facts? (1) I may take it for granted that we all know that our modern word "Person" is not a fair or satisfactory rendering of either the Greek Hypostasis or even the Latin Persona. We have become so much accustomed to hearing the word "Persons" used to translate the technical phrase, that we sometimes forget how vague, and how little personal in themselves, the old Latin and Greek terms are. (2) Turning to something more positive, one fact which the technical formula is meant to convey is this—that the three eternal Beings or Realities are equal. They are all alike fully and wholly God, in the fullest sense of the word. They are equal in honour, all equally claiming and deserving human homage and worship. The substance, the nature, the inner essence of all alike is Godhead. (3) Then again, they are absolutely united. As the old writers expressed it, the kingdom or reign of God is a Monarchy. God is essentially active (says one Greek theologian), and there is no moment of the Divine activity in which all Three are not jointly concerned. And perhaps we may complete his thought by adding that there is *no experience* of joy or sorrow, of triumphant or rejected love, of human loyalty or rebellion, of honour or insult, which all do not inevitably share together. They are not three rival objects of faith or devotion. If we understand the truth about Them,

* Sermon preached before the University of Cambridge on March 6, 1932, by the Rev. R. H. Moberly, Principal of Bishops' College, Cheshunt.

any faith or homage which we render to Them is bound, by the nature of the case, to be undivided. We cannot trust or honour, obey or disobey, One without including in that same act all the Three. (4) Though They are inseparably united, the distinction between Them is absolutely real. It is not a matter of our imagination or of our limited thought. It is not that God chooses to manifest Himself in three disguises. There are really Three Beings, eternally distinct from one another. The Father is not the Son, and the Son is not the Spirit. When They are spoken of as being One, this is not a matter of numerical unity. They are not one and the same: They are united in love and concord, in unity of thought and will, in loyal co-operation. (5) Nor is the unity in any way accidental or arbitrary. It is part of the nature of the Godhead. They unite and co-operate of Their own will; but we can also say that such unity is inevitable, because it is due to an inner necessity of Their own Being.

II

It seems that this—or something very like it—is part of what the technical formula was meant to express. But when we ask more precisely the question, What is meant by such words as Hypostasis and Persona? What (in other words) is the nature of the distinction between the Three? or how are They related to one another?—then the technical terms fail us. They are deliberately vague. As Augustine says, they were not used because they were felt to be satisfactory or clear, but for want of any better terms. Indeed, their very vagueness was part of their value.

If we want any clearer light on this problem, we must needs look at the simpler language of the Church's Creeds. And we must try to interpret the language there used in the light of the New Testament and other early Christian writings—especially the writings of those theologians of the fourth and fifth centuries who did most to secure the acceptance both of the Creeds and of the rather vague philosophical formula which we have been considering hitherto.

III

Following this method of approach, let us begin by looking at the relation between the First and Second Personæ (or Hypostases) of the Eternal Trinity. In this case the language habitually used implies a relationship between Them of Persons or Personalities, in our modern sense of the term. One is called the Father, the Other is called the Son. One is the Begotten, the Other is the Unbegotten. Even though in the writers of the second century the phrase "Logos" (Word or Reason) is more

frequently used, yet as time goes on the other great New Testament title "Son" (a title of even earlier and more authoritative origin) increasingly takes its place; or at least this word "Son" is more and more used to supplement it and to guard against misunderstanding. When the Council of Nicæa took the Baptismal Creed of Eusebius of Cæsarea and revised it for oecumenical use, they deliberately substituted the phrase "Son" for "Logos."

Christ is described, then, most characteristically as the Eternal Son of the Father, or (in the phrase of a great Greek theologian) as One who is eternally being begotten by Him. In the Gospels we find that Each loves the Other and speaks to the Other; that the Son looks to the Father in gratitude and trust, adoring love and obedience. And one writer after another in those early centuries emphasizes the conviction of the Church that this relationship of mutual love does not merely belong to the days of our Lord's life on earth, nor even to the conditions of His permanent Manhood, but it goes back to His eternal life in Heaven. Sonship means primarily an attitude of filial love and dependence, and that has been His relationship to God the Father from all eternity.

Thus, though neither the word Hypostasis nor its Latin counterpart Persona in itself *connotes* personality in our sense of the word, yet *in this case* that is what it comes in fact to *denote*. If the Son is said to have (or to be) a distinct Hypostasis, this comes virtually to mean that He is (or has) a distinct Personality, with His own self-consciousness and will, though acting always in perfect harmony with the Father.

IV

When we turn to consider how the Third Divine Persona is related to the other Two, at once we find a difference. Words expressing what we now call "personal" relationship are not used. Indeed, they are not only carefully avoided, but writers on the orthodox side emphatically deny that they can ever rightly be used in this connection at all. "Arians" or "Macedonians" might declare that if the Holy Spirit is not a creature or an angel, then He must needs be either another Son of the Father or else a Grandson (a Son of the Son). But orthodox writers retort that all such language is utterly inapplicable and meaningless: the Third Persona is neither Begotten nor Unbegotten. To them it seemed clear that such terms as Father, Son, or Brother, have no meaning in this connection. The distinction between the Holy Spirit and the Father or the Son cannot be expressed in any of those terms which we use to distinguish different members of a family or a society.

In place of such terms quite a different set of phrases is regularly employed. The Holy Spirit is said not to be "begotten" of the Father, but to "proceed" or issue forth from Him. The Spirit is an "Effluence"—that which flows out from the Father and into us His creatures. Perhaps I may be allowed to suggest in passing that, if there is any objection to the word "Influence" as a description of the Holy Spirit, it is not the word itself that is at fault: it is we who have got into the habit of misusing the word, of employing it with less than its full meaning. We speak disparagingly of the idea of a "*mere* influence." Rather we should recognize that personal influence is nothing less than the very life of another personality flowing into us.

So the one most characteristic title of the Third Persona is "Spirit," or "Breath" of God. The Cappadocian Fathers of the fourth century, who had much to do with the final shaping of the Church's doctrinal statements, lay stress on this idea. They are careful indeed to guard against misleading inferences. They warn us that the Spirit is not something external to the being of the Father, like the air which we draw into our lungs and then breathe out again. Nor is the Spirit a mere passing breath, like a puff of wind which comes and is gone. But all the more notable is the value which they set on this word "Breath" when rightly understood. The Holy Spirit (they say in effect) is the Eternal Life-breath of the Father. Just as the Son was not once begotten in the past, but is eternally being begotten, so the Spirit has ever proceeded and is eternally proceeding from the Father. As the Father's own Life and Breath, the Spirit belongs to His very being and is inseparable from Him.

The Spirit is Breath, is Life, is Love. For Love is the essential nature of God; love is His life. And so, in the language of Augustine, the Spirit is said to be the Bond of Union between Father and Son.

Again, the Spirit is said to descend on us—or upon Jesus in His earthly life: to come upon us and to enter into us. The Spirit is not *with* us, or alongside of us, as one personality is alongside of another; but *in* us. It is true that St. Paul can also speak of Christ as living in him. But that is the language of mysticism. Not for a moment would I suggest that mystical language is less true or profound than the more prosaic language of what I may call "cold, scientific Theology." But when the Church framed its dogmas, it was trying to talk scientific theology—however cold its phrases might be. And it is that kind of theology that we are now considering. Translated into those colder but more logical terms, St. Paul's phrase "Christ

in me" would surely become "Christ with me, and (therefore) the Spirit of Christ in me." We are reminded of words spoken (according to the Fourth Gospel) by our Lord Himself, "He dwelleth with you, and shall be in you."* That is to say, while Christ was living His earthly life, the Spirit was only known to men as indwelling in Him. But presently the time would come when the visible presence of Christ would have passed away and the Spirit of God (which is the Spirit of Christ) would be dwelling in the disciples themselves. A new life-power would be within them, moulding them more and more into the likeness of their unseen Master.

"Spirit" or "Breath," then, is the Church's chosen word—learned (apparently) from our Lord Himself. In Greek it is a neuter word and in Latin, though grammatically the word *Spiritus* is masculine, yet the idea which it expresses is neuter. For this reason it is of some importance to remind ourselves how easily we can be misled by the English versions of the New Testament—Authorized and Revised alike. They regularly substitute the masculine pronoun "He" in reference to the Holy Spirit, but in an immense number of passages it would be at least as true a rendering of the original to retain the neuter pronoun "It."

It is also significant—and I do not think that this fact is always noticed as much as it deserves to be—that in the "Constantinopolitan" Creed (commonly known to-day as the Nicene Creed), the phrase rendered in English "the Lord and Giver of Life" is really in the neuter: not τὸν κύριον, but τὸ κύριον. Probably we could best render this passage by using the word "Sovereign"—which is both adjective and noun in English, just as κύριος is in Greek. "We believe in the Spirit—the Holy, Sovereign, Life-giving Spirit." So rendered, the words (coupled with the phrases which follow) still imply a tremendous claim—that the Spirit is God in the full sense of the word, "of one substance with the Father" (just as the Son is), equally and unitedly with Them the object of implicit faith and homage and worship. But there is certainly no kind of insistence on any description of the Spirit as a distinct personality. Indeed, it would be nearer the truth to say that the words used definitely suggest (like some of the most striking phrases of theologians of that time) that such an idea is scarcely applicable at all.

There are two further points bearing on this subject, which seem to me illuminating, if they are true. But I have not enough knowledge to speak with certainty. (1) I believe that it has not been the normal instinct of the Christian Church to address petitions to the Holy Spirit. To-day we sometimes hear

* According to many MSS.

this mentioned with regret, as though it showed that we had failed to grasp the meaning of the doctrine of the Holy Spirit. But is it not at least possible that in this matter the unconscious instinct of the Church has been right? The Holy Spirit is a fit Object not only of meditation but of adoration: but may it not be true that, except in poetry, we should rather address our words to the Father or the Son? At least we shall be in line with the deepest convictions of Eastern theologians—often more thoroughly and subtly logical than their Western brethren—if we say that, strictly speaking, all prayer should be addressed to the Father, *through* the Son, *in* the Holy Spirit.

(2) Is it not also true that Christian Art has instinctively avoided attempting to portray the Holy Spirit in human form? Artists have been criticized for representing God the Father in the likeness of a man, and no doubt the criticism is important. But yet it has, in fact, often been done. On the other hand, so far as my knowledge goes, any such representation of the Holy Spirit is either unknown to Art or almost unknown. If this be true, then artists have followed the guidance of the Biblical writers. In the Bible the Father is described as seen in visions in what appears to be human form: whereas the Holy Spirit is only depicted under some symbolic form—as a dove, or as fire or wind.

V

Hitherto we have been thinking of the Three distinct Personæ, though recognizing that the Church has always insisted that they are utterly, eternally, and essentially united. Now may we (rather briefly) look at the subject from the other end—approaching the Trinity, that is to say, through the Unity.

God is essentially Love: Love is His nature and being. The thought is familiar to theologians of the period we are considering. It is (indeed) a truth not originally discovered by philosophical analysis, but through experience of the life of Christ. But, once we have recognized that God is Love, we begin to see that there must needs be a certain three-foldness in the Godhead, for Love is three-fold. There must be a Lover, and an object of His love: and that beloved One must also be capable of giving back love in return. Or (to quote Augustine's words) there is in the Godhead "One who loves Him who is from Himself, and one who loves Him from whom he is." There is the Paternal Lover, and the Filial Lover: One whose love is essentially originaive and (as it were) protective, and One whose love is fundamentally grateful, trustful, and reverent. And these Two are eternally united in that Divine life of giving (*i.e.* of loving). All divine activity originates with the Father, and is carried out by the

Son: or (with equal truth) we may say that Both are always thinking, willing, acting, together gladly and freely in perfect harmony. Then, thirdly, there is the "Gift" (to use Augustine's phrase again)—the Life, the Love which is in Them both: that Life, that Love, which issues forth eternally from Father to Son, which eternally comes back from the Son to the Father; and which ever streams out from Both into men and all God's creatures. Their mutual Love, the Bond of Union between Them, is (as it were) the spark of life, kindled eternally by their contact, which issuing forth from Them sets the whole world on fire: the eternal flame of Divinity which is the true life of all things.

VI

I have been harping on the use of the neuter gender in our language about the Holy Spirit. And I do want to urge that this way of speaking helps us to see at least one part—and a very valuable part—of the truth: a side of truth which we should probably miss if we insisted on using the masculine gender. St. Paul certainly did not hesitate to speak in this way. "Who among men" (so he writes to the Corinthians) "knoweth the things of a man, save the spirit of the man which is in him? Even so the things of God none knoweth save the Spirit of God." I do not suggest that he regarded this analogy between the spirit of man and the Spirit of God as complete, but he certainly saw no harm in using it.

It is true that we have also to remember another part of the evidence. There are many passages in the New Testament and other early Christian writings, in which the Holy Spirit is spoken of in language which would naturally describe a person in our sense of the word. There are even some (though I think they are fewer than is sometimes supposed) which seem to demand this or even to assert it. Most notable among these is the language ascribed to our Lord in the Fourth Gospel, in the great closing discourses. There the Holy Spirit is spoken of repeatedly as the Paraclete (or Advocate). And where the words "Spirit" and "Paraclete" occur together, it is the masculine pronoun which is employed in the rest of each passage. "*He* shall teach you all things." Here for once (in contrast with the passages which I referred to before) the English is in no way misleading. It is saying no more than the Greek itself contains.

We must admit, then, if we are to do full justice to the Church's traditional language, that there may well be a real value in the use of the masculine gender with regard to the Holy Spirit. We probably widen our conception of the Second

"Person" of the Trinity by varying the title of "Son" with that of "Logos"—a word which rather takes us away from the thought of a Personality. And, conversely, we can perhaps widen our conception of the Third "Person" by using such a title as "Paraclete," and by the use of the masculine pronoun. Yet it still remains true that the First and Second "Persons" are normally spoken of in the masculine gender, as being personalities, as being *with* us or coming *to* us (even the title Logos gave way increasingly to that of Son, or was carefully balanced by it); while the Third "Person" is normally spoken of as neuter—as Wind, Breath, Life, Power, Love—as descending upon men and dwelling *in* them. However inadequate the phrase may be, we can—for certain purposes—speak of the Father or of the Son as being, Each of Them, *a* Personality—almost as being an individual. But if we are to use such a term in connection with the Holy Spirit, we should probably be nearer the truth in speaking of Him not as *a* personality but as *Personality*—as the personality of each one of us—as the Life which is within us—as that which constitutes each one of us a self with the dignity of personality at all. No doubt even this way of speaking is not strictly accurate, but nevertheless it seems to me to come near enough to the truth to have real suggestiveness about it.

VII

As a boy, I used to wonder whether there might not be a yet further revelation to come. Three Persons of the Godhead had been revealed: might we not in time to come receive the revelation of a fourth? Obviously I was conceiving of the Holy Spirit as virtually another Son of the Father: and I am inclined to think that there is much popular thought along these lines, and that not a little current theological language is open to the same criticism. But, looked at in some such light as I have been suggesting, the doctrine of the Trinity stands out with a completeness and a finality such as the Church has consistently claimed for it.

(1) The Three are seen to be necessary to One another. If the essence of Godhead is Love, and if God is revealed first and foremost as the great Creative Lover, then there must needs be also an eternal Object of His love—One who can render back that perfect love to Him again. To put it in the simple and terse form familiar to the early theologians, if God's eternal nature is to be a Father, then from all eternity He must have had a Son. And furthermore, if the Ultimate Reality includes these two eternal Lovers, it must also include a great Life-force, the Life-force of that same Love; flashing out like a fire from

them—or streaming out like a fountain of water of life—or (shall we say?) breathed forth as their Eternal Life-breath. There must needs, then, be Three elements in that Eternal Reality which is God.

(2) And there is no need for more than Three. For the Holy Spirit includes all the life that is—except, of course, what is evil. But the problem of Evil need not disturb us in this connection, partly because it remains equally a problem on any view of the doctrine of the Trinity, and partly because—as Christians—we do not regard Evil as part of the Ultimate Reality at all, for we do not regard it as eternal. And if, in the world and in man, in any part or the whole of creation, there is an element that is eternal, that element is just the indwelling life of the Holy Spirit.

Thus, Father, Son and Holy Spirit are indeed the sum total of all eternal Reality. There is no need for more, and there is no room for more. My boyish problem disappeared as soon as I was taught to think of the Holy Trinity in this way.

VIII

It would seem, then, that in speaking of God as a Trinity we are really recognizing *two different lines of distinction* in the Godhead. (1) There is the distinction between God transcendent and God immanent. Both of these aspects of God's being were familiar to the world before Christ came. Christianity did not teach men for the first time either that there is a Creator or that there is an indwelling Spirit of Life. Its special contribution in this matter was twofold. (i.) It taught men to combine these two—apparently contrary—conceptions of God; to see them not merely as reconcilable with one another, but as mutually dependent. (ii.) But specially it gave a new and richer meaning to these old truths. It taught men that the great transcendent Creator was their Father, and that the Divine Life dwelling within all things is fundamentally the life of Love.

May I pause here to remind you how precious this doctrine of Divine Immanence is? We are told to-day that too much attention has been paid to the thought of Immanence: that what we need is to get back from such wanderings to the conception of Divine Transcendence. This may be very true in regard to certain special departments of thought. But it seems to me rather that, in certain other directions which I am about to mention, orthodox Christian thought is hardly grasping the idea of God's Immanence at all. I have had frequent evidence that it comes like a new and life-giving revelation to many people who have been brought up on the conventional lines of modern

Christian teaching—even to very genuine and earnest Christians. Perhaps they meet with Christian Science, or with what is called "New Thought," with its insistence on the reality of the Divine life within us all: with its message, "Do not exhaust yourself with anxious straining out to reach a God Who is far away, or Who at least is outside you and Whom you have found strangely inaccessible. God is within you. You have but to realize this fact, and yield yourself to the pressure and movement of that Divine life within, and you will be a changed man. You will be steadily growing in power and beauty and love, for the Divine life within you will be emerging and possessing you wholly." People who have accepted this message have told me that, for the first time, their religion has begun to mean something to them: it has become a thing of power.

Again, there is the experience of the artist or poet, who finds in Nature a Divine life, something eternal and infinite, beautiful beyond all words—the vision of ineffable Beauty which he in his art is ever feebly trying to express. He too knows the life-giving value of the recognition of the indwelling life of God in Nature and in Man.

Or again the scientist, who recognizes a great life-force (it may be), but who is baffled by our talk of an eternal Father or Creator. He too, in his different way, bears witness to that "something eternal," which is revealed at the back of all things and in all things.

Alike for the artist and for the man of science, the first word of the Christian message is the same: "That God, whom ye unknowingly worship as Beauty or as Life-force, is Love. Love is Its essential nature, the deepest, truest description of It."

And to the adherent of Christian Science or New Thought we say, "Thank God that you have come to recognize the fact of Divine Immanence. Hold on to it and treasure it. But it is all part of the Church's message to men. It is the doctrine of the Holy Spirit which you have discovered. If the Church has not taught it to you long ago, she is neglecting part of her message. In the end you will find that you cannot separate it from the doctrine of the Father and the Son: and that Immanence without Transcendence is an impossible and unsatisfying creed. But what you hold positively is priceless and most Christian. Our only quarrel is with your denials, with your refusal to recognize any Divinity except in finite beings."

But does not the great appeal of religious movements of this kind—the strong hold of Hindu Pantheism—the difficulty which such men as artists and scientists often have in reconciling their own religious experience with what they take to be the Christian

doctrine of God—does not all this suggest very strongly that we have failed to grasp that doctrine and preach it in its fulness? Popular thought—yes, and the thought of many religious teachers—seems to have so lost sight of the real vastness of the conception of the Holy Spirit as the Divine Fire, or Life, or Love, which indwells in all things, that it has tended to represent that Spirit as just a kind of second Son of God. And the man who has caught the vision of God in His immanence, cannot recognize it as part of the Christian Gospel.

There are those who say that an infinite and eternal God cannot be a Person, that such a conception of the Deity is far too narrow and limited. To them we would reply, "Our religion recognizes all that. God is indeed all that we mean by a Person: if that means little or nothing to you, it is none the less a vital fact in the religious experience of numbers of others. But God is also the Spirit of Life, of personal life as well as of other life. Christianity has maintained both of these truths from the start, and has insisted that each involves the other."

(2) Then there is another line of distinction in the Godhead—the distinction between God as Father and God as Son: the Paternal Lover and the Filial Lover. Both are Love, through and through. Both are filled with the Spirit and breathe forth the Spirit. The Spirit is the Bond of Union between Them. But One is essentially and unalterably originative and protective: the Other is essentially filial and grateful. Thus yet another childish difficulty is swept away. I used to wonder (and I think many others have done so), "If God the Father so loved the world, why did He give His only-begotten Son? Why did He not give Himself? Why did *He* not come and suffer, if suffering was needed?" Not every Christian sees the answer to that problem. But would it not be at once far plainer to all if they had grasped the distinction between filial and paternal Love? It is the essential nature of the Second Person of the Trinity to be a Son: and sonship to God is the true nature of mankind, only we have failed to attain it. To become man, then, was no contradiction for the eternal Son of God. It was a marvel of Love and self-abasement, but no contradiction. It meant living out His eternal Sonship under human conditions. For the Father to become man would have been an utter contradiction. His nature is Fatherhood, ours is Sonship. But the Son could do so without laying aside anything of His essential Godhead. He subjected Himself to the conditions of human life. He accepted all its inevitable limitations—physical, intellectual, and moral. He was limited by time and space; limited in knowledge and power; subject to the indignity of being tempted and of feeling the subtle attraction of evil. But one thing

which He did not lay aside for a moment was His eternal love. And Love—perfect and eternal—is the very meaning of Godhead.

Finally, we look for the connection between these two lines of distinction in the Godhead. What have they to do with one another? Why are they summed up together in one statement which we call the doctrine of the Trinity? And the reply seems to be something like this:—It was through the Incarnation of the Son of God, through His Passion and Resurrection and Ascension, that the Church experienced the great outpouring of the Holy Spirit at Pentecost. This close connection between the life of the Son and of the Spirit continued to be an ever-present fact of Christian experience. And so the Church was guided to the inference that there was some necessary connection between the “sending” of the Son and of the Spirit, not only in time but in eternity, between the eternal begetting or generation of the Son and the eternal procession or coming forth of the Spirit. Moreover, this inference was borne out by the experience of what the indwelling of the Spirit in fact means. The Spirit which had entered into men was seen as the Spirit of Sonship, of response to the Love of God. That response is the true life of mankind and of all created things. So far as man makes that response, we are aware of the divine life of the Holy Spirit within him. Because the response is so widely made in some degree, greater or less, consciously or unconsciously, we can recognize what many Christians in the earliest generations seem hardly to have been aware of at all—that the same Spirit of God (and of Christ) does indeed dwell in vast numbers who have never heard of Christ: that God the Holy Spirit is the very life of them, so far as their life is good at all: that this same Spirit is indeed the life which is in bird and beast and plant, the power that guides the whole created world, as it responds to the loving will of God and obeys the Divine laws.

Recognizing, then, that the Spirit of God is in all created things the Spirit of Sonship or of Response, the Church has seen that the Son is the link between Transcendence and Immanence in the Godhead. Thus He is rightly called the *Second Person* of the Trinity. There is an order in the Godhead, as some of the early theologians are never tired of assuring us. It is *through the Son* that the Spirit proceeds from the Father. All life which has any derived reality comes from the Father, from the interplay of life between Father and Son. Man and (in one sense) all creatures have been made in the likeness of that Son. And the response which we gradually learn to render to the infinite love of both Father and Son is the prompting of the Holy Spirit within us—“the Spirit of His Son in our hearts, whereby we cry, Abba, Father.”

THE KNOWLEDGE OF GOD

I

THE definition of the chief end of man given by the Scottish Catechism as "to know God and enjoy Him for ever" expresses in the shortest possible way the essential aim of all true religion. The defence, expansion, and annotation of this thesis would involve the development of an exhaustive theological and philosophical system such as has not been attempted since St. Thomas Aquinas. The modest purpose of this essay is related solely to one term in the above definition "*to know*"—to ask what we mean by knowledge and in what sense man can be said to know God. There can, of course, be no attempt here at a thorough treatment of the epistemological problem. It will be enough if its main factors can be roughly stated and if we can arrive at a sufficiently definite point of view to make the old question of the knowledge of God stand out in a new light. And this enquiry will have a practical aim in that we shall try to keep in view the kind of way in which the "plain man" thinks about these things and the kind of difficulties he experiences in making real to himself the idea of knowing God. There can be little doubt that many people today hesitate to use the language of Christian theology, or even the less precise language of Christian devotion, because the knowledge of God, the familiar subject of that language, appears to them so utterly different from all that they ordinarily speak of as knowledge as to lack any easily comprehensible meaning. This hesitation will only be removed when, and in so far as, they can be induced to undertake a little elementary epistemological thinking for themselves. It is the purpose of this essay tentatively to suggest a way of approaching this exercise.

II

What do we mean by knowledge? Something so intimately bound up with our whole mental activity that to capture and analyze it involves a turning in upon ourselves which those unaccustomed to introspection cannot easily accomplish. The object to be examined is a phase of the examiner's own interior life, and it is no more possible to detach the thought from the thinker than it is to set "life" under the microscope in isolation from some form or other of living organism. The thinker is actually engaged in the operation of thinking at every moment in which he has the process under examination. Reflections of

this kind convince us that the first and most immediate form of knowledge is that which is the natural concomitant of personal life—namely, *self-knowledge*, or as we often term it, *self-consciousness*. It is the knowledge I have of myself as “I.” We are all Cartesians to the extent of accepting this as axiomatic and fundamental—“*cogito, ergo sum.*” It is the datum of all experience, since no experience would be possible without it. Dispensing ourselves from the necessity of accurately defining terms, it may suffice to call this knowledge *intuitive*. In any classification of the ways of knowing, this would come first. In a sense it is a knowledge *sui generis*, for in the nature of things no other knowledge can share quite fully the peculiar immediacy and self-evidencing quality of self-consciousness. Whether any object other than the self is known in this intuitive way is a question of some importance which may be left for the moment.

Next to its consciousness of itself the ego assumes as yielding knowledge, with a greater or less degree of certainty, the impressions received through the senses—knowledge given by perception. Let us call it perceptual knowledge. We say with a greater or less degree of certainty, for everyone is familiar with the notion that our senses sometimes deceive us. Nevertheless on the whole we can trust them. Of this type are all our contacts with the external world. Apart from any possibility of “thought-transference” or other form of direct contact between spirit and spirit, we should live in a closed universe, co-terminous with our self-consciousness, if it were not for the data of sense-impressions. The external world can find no ingress to the self except through the senses. Not only so, but such commerce between the self and the external world appears to be a necessary condition of the development and integration of the self. No precise knowledge even of my self would be possible unless I were able through the senses to gain awareness of the “not-self.” By contact therewith I first learn to distinguish my self from the experiences which my self undergoes. In the process, self-consciousness is progressively intensified and expanded. On the contrary, the self-knowledge of a blind and deaf mute would presumably remain inchoate and indeterminate unless and until some communication with the external world could be established through one of his remaining senses.

But it must be noted also that this way of knowing *by itself* could give, and does give, knowledge only of *particulars*. Through sense-perception I know only isolated, individual objects. The generalization by which I separate off all impressions of a certain type into one class, and give them a generic

name, is not itself a sense-perception at all. It is a subsequent process of reflection upon the sense data.

The third type of knowledge, therefore, is inferential, and of course includes immeasurably the largest part of the sum of our knowledge. It is the resultant of the mind's activity upon the material presented by experience. It is the way in which we form concepts, know *universals* as distinct from particulars, and indeed arrive at all abstract truth. Moreover, it is this alone which binds the infinitely various and disparate elements of a living experience into one rational and coherent whole.

And because knowledge obtained in this way has been worked over by the mind, has received from, and added to, the complex of thought, it is that which is most personal, most peculiar to the individual, and therefore commonly most stubbornly adhered to throughout life.

We have, then, it is suggested, three types of knowledge—the intuitive, the perceptual, and the inferential, or conceptual. Are these three all equally valid and “real”—that is, true?

III

Clearly the division given above, and probably any other division which might be proposed, is not logically precise or free from overlapping. Nor is it difficult to see where such overlapping exists. Thus, in the intuitive knowledge of the self, there is always a substratum of perceptual knowledge—i.e., the sense impressions of one's own physical state, of heat or cold, comfort or discomfort, of the movement of heart and lungs. These are being received without cessation at every moment of the waking life. Again, there is always a measure of inferential knowledge in what we are apt to regard as purely sensory perceptions. I say that I know a certain physical object when I see it—what I really mean is that by means of a conceptual process I interpret certain visual impressions as indicating the presence of that physical object. We cannot know the “*Ding an sich*,” we never know the *thing* apart from the interpretation our minds put upon it. And here it is worth remarking that modern mathematical physics seems to be moving towards a similar position—one long ago recognized in metaphysics.

It appears, therefore, that like all attempts at an analysis and classification of the nature and functions of a living experience, as distinct from an inanimate object, this division of the ways of knowing is to some extent arbitrary; it emphasizes merely certain discernible differences in the quality of our knowledge. Yet some such division will serve a useful purpose

if it enables us to estimate the extent to which the ordinarily accepted kinds of knowledge are, in fact, true and valid. That estimate we must now attempt to form.

About the data of intuition—at least in so far as it is exclusively a knowledge of the self—there can be no discussion. I cannot doubt my own existence without thereby impugning everything else I know, or think I could know. There can be no knowledge unless there is a knower. Of all knowledge that which the self has of itself is the most immediate, self-substantiating and unassailable.

But what of perceptual knowledge? As has been said, there are grave reasons for doubting whether *by itself* sense-perception gives any real knowledge at all—of anything, that is, beyond the perception itself, a purely mental event. But then the perception never is by itself. There is probably no such thing as pure perception. No sooner is the sense-perception received than it becomes, first, part of my knowledge of myself (*i.e.*, begins to share the nature of intuition), and, secondly, it becomes rationalized, the subject of numerous swift unnoticed inferences, correlated with the rest of my knowledge, built in to the fabric of my thought. This is why the philosophical impossibility of knowing the “thing in itself” causes so little inconvenience to scientific experiment and theory. The knowledge given by perception passes over so invariably and irrevocably into the other types that we can have no wish to try to dislodge the conviction of the plain man that his senses are on the whole to be trusted, nor to deride Dr. Johnson’s vigorous refutation of idealism, even though we may deny its relevance.

When we turn to inferential knowledge—the constructions of the mind working upon sense-data and its own previous content—we seem at first sight to be dealing with something which lacks both the immediacy of intuition and the concreteness, the objectivity of perception. In consequence, many people would be inclined to regard knowledge of this type as in some way inferior in certainty, and in correspondence with reality, to what they think the “plain facts” of perception; an idea is less real than a thing. A little reflection upon the meaning of such terms as reality, truth, existence, should, however, go to show that this is an illusion. For what in the last resort is knowledge? what is truth? what is the test of reality? Is not the essential and definitive element in each case coherence, rationality? To know is to place, to docket, to correlate. That is true which is significant, symmetrical, in ascertainable relation with the already known. The unknown is the incoherent; the untrue is the chaotic, the meaningless. An illustration may be found in the phenomena of hallucination.

A child may say it has seen a fairy. Sir Arthur Conan Doyle would even claim to have photographed one! What is to be the test in such cases? Again, we have stories all down the ages, such as that which gained currency in the War about "the Angels of Mons." Who is to say what truth lies behind these? The test can hardly be one of sense-perception, for none but those who had the original experience—either of fairies or angels—is in a position to apply it, and *they* are quite certain of the objectivity of their vision. Surely the test to be applied is one of rational coherence. Do these things take their place naturally in the whole scheme of things? Can they be assigned a true significance and a symmetrical place in our philosophy? Or are they meaningless, disjointed, chaotic? Such a test as this will tend, for many of us at any rate, to legitimate belief in the objective existence of angels and to disallow that of fairies. The knowledge, therefore, which has the greatest claim to reality and truth is that which "fits," which is most easily made coherent with existing knowledge, or, still more, gives greater coherence and rationality to the already known, supplies as it were a key which has long been expected and sought for. As no knowledge beyond the mere knowledge of self-existence is possible without inference, so the range and depth and clarity of knowledge will be increased in proportion as the inference made is wide and deep and clear, both in its justifying basis and its necessary consequences.

We may say, then, that this type of knowledge, so far from lacking, as the unphilosophical might suppose, the concreteness and certainty of the other two, has in fact all the marks of reality which a consideration of the nature of knowledge would lead us to anticipate. And indeed all knowledge would appear to be true only to the degree in which it exhibits the characteristic marks of conceptual thought.

IV

We are now in a position to approach the question, What do we mean by the knowledge of God? As has been said, an adequate answer to this question would involve by way of prolegomena an exhaustive review of the whole field of philosophy and theology; a critical investigation of history; probably also some discussion of psychology and anthropology. But even a subject so massive and momentous may profitably be viewed from one limited angle, provided the limitation of outlook is not lost sight of. Closer acquaintance with the individual tree is sometimes not without result in a better appreciation of the wood as a whole.

Our concern here is, then, simply with the question as to what psychological process is operative in man's knowledge of God, and whether we can trust that process to lead us to truth and reality. Following on the line of thought pursued so far, we shall ask, To which of the three types—intuitive, perceptual, inferential—does the knowledge of God conform?

An answer definitely in favour of the first is returned by the mystics. They would say that they have experienced an immediate contact with God into which the element of discursive reasoning does not enter at all. God is known by an intuition as immediate, as self-evidencing and as unclouded, as the knowledge of the self. And whether or not he is to be classed as a mystic himself, the highly philosophic mind of Newman believed that God and the soul were two equally luminous certainties. Again, we now have Dr. Otto lending the weight of his authority to this view, and claiming to take the distinctive element in the knowledge of God—which he terms the “numinous”—out of the sphere of the intellect altogether, and to find it in the feelings. This feeling of the numinous he asserts to be of the immediate, intuitive order.

It is no part of our purpose to discuss the phenomena of mysticism, much less to controvert the statements of those great souls who have passed into the realms where men hear words which it is not lawful to utter. Nevertheless, there are serious objections against accepting the above account of the matter. The most grave of these is that if the mystics' experience is the normal and typical way to the knowledge of God, it would seem to be open only to a comparatively small number of privileged, and perhaps specially endowed, souls. For there can be no doubt that the majority even of devout Christian people do *not* have this immediate, intuitive experience of God. We cannot acquiesce in any return to the eclecticism from which the preaching of the Gospel delivered the highest religious aspiration and belief of the age in which it appeared. There is, of course, no need to deny—rather we should thankfully acknowledge—that there are souls, in every place and nation and epoch, to whom the being and nature of God are revealed with that direct indubitable certainty and vividness which we all recognize as the outstanding quality of our self-knowledge. But this is not to admit that such is the ordinary way in which God makes the mind of man aware of Himself. That normal way of approach will be sought elsewhere—in the mental and spiritual experience characteristic of humble and ungifted souls.

Another objection may be suggested more tentatively. In proportion as any object of knowledge may come to share the unique immediacy of our knowledge of the self, it may be supposed to become merged *in* that self. For it is characteristic of intuition that it shuts in the intuitively known within the circle which includes the self and excludes the not-self. Thus God known in this way becomes exclusively God-in-me. May this not be the reason why mysticism has always been beset by the danger of pantheism? That it has often been successful in clearing itself of this charge proves no more than what has been already admitted—namely, that *some* souls may know the not-self intuitively and yet succeed in preserving the distinction which marks off God from His creatures.

Let us, however, pass on; perhaps the reasonableness of this criticism will appear when we come to examine the third of our types in relation to the knowledge of God. For we need not stop to discuss the second in that connection. Clearly God is not an object of perception. The senses are indeed an avenue to the knowledge of His handiwork, but mediate no contact with God Himself. If the mind can rise from contemplation of the created world to knowledge of the Creator, it must be through that process of inference which was held to be man's ultimate road to truth and reality. When Addison wrote of the heavenly bodies that

"In reason's ear they all rejoice,
And utter forth a glorious voice;
For ever singing, as they shine,
'The hand that made us is divine,'"

he was making use of an argument as old as that nineteenth Psalm which gave him his text. And no one—until Kant criticized its metaphysical, and the nineteenth-century naturalists its physical, basis—doubted that this cosmological argument was a legitimate way in which the mind's ascent to God could be stated. If now we admit the cogency of the Kantian critique and the profound modification of our "*Weltanschauung*" brought about by the pressure of modern scientific theory, we shall still hold that the mental constructions which conceptual thought erects are only to be raised on a new foundation—we shall not abandon the constructive method itself.

How then is the knowledge of God arrived at by inference? It has already been pointed out that the nature of conception is to give us universals as distinct from the particulars revealed by perception. Now it is obvious that the more numerous, significant and typical the particulars worked upon, the wider and more illuminating will be the universal inferred. And if *all* available particulars are taken into account and their relative importance rightly assessed, will not the universal arrived at

be the nearest approach to the ground of all rational thought, the one absolute Universal, which the human mind is capable of apprehending? So the Ultimate Inference will be God.

Two consequences follow from this. First, in any attempt to rise to the knowledge of God, all the data presented both by the intuitive knowledge of the self, and by sense-perception of the external world, must be taken account of. Secondly, all will depend on a right selection of the most significant and outstanding of these phenomena if the true inference is to be made from them. What gift will enable us to make such a discrimination? It is suggested that the answer to this question is—Faith. The data are approximately the same for all of us; the truly significant are available, we should maintain, to all who will reflect upon the facts of life. Why is it, then, that one man will infer from the mass of available data no more than a universe informed by blind force, while another will make the great inference and rise to the knowledge of God? The answer is that all have not faith. Faith, we believe, is that interior faculty or disposition by which we are enabled to select and assess rightly the significant elements in our common experience and press forward to the goal which they indicate; to grasp the reality which alone interprets them; to see them in their right relation to one another and to the whole—the goal, the reality which is God. The man who has not faith either omits some of the data from his survey—*e.g.*, the fact of personality; conscience; the all-pervading and all-accomplishing power of love—or else he judges wrongly of their relative importance—*e.g.*, he is overawed by mere magnitude and points to man's infinitesimal littleness in a vast universe. Moreover, when we apply the test of reality—that coherence, that symmetry, that illumination of the complex of previously existing knowledge by the final key-thought—which we held to be the only possible criterion of truth, the idea of God is found by the man of faith to possess all these qualities in a supreme degree, in a way which justifies that idea to himself as no other concept can.

It is argued, therefore, that God is ordinarily known by man—and this is the way in which normal, unmystical souls must be content to know Him—by a process of inference which is not different in kind from that by which he arrives at the rest of his rationally conceived knowledge. As he rises by inference from the knowledge of particular acts of a loving will to the concept of love; from the perception of beautiful things to the concept of beauty; and from the contemplation of things which are true to the concept of truth; so discriminating by faith from the whole mass of his experience those things which are godlike, he will rise to the concept, the true knowledge, of God.

V

The question now remains to be considered whether the argument which has been advanced will go any way towards relieving the pressure of those doubts to which attention was drawn in the first paragraph. The difficulty arises from the spacious appearance of greater reality which the external world, perceived through the senses, possesses for the plain man, in contrast to the spiritual world, which is not so perceived. He does not deny that such abstract concepts as goodness, beauty, and truth are real in their way, but he is inclined to allow to the term reality, as applied to them, a merely secondary and derivative sense. It is a sort of courtesy title beside which the "solid facts" of the material world stand out with an arrogant and indisputable right to be named as alone truly real. It is only in keeping with this mental attitude that the supremely abstract concept of the Being of God should seem even more shadowy and insubstantial. Before this difficulty can be removed we shall have to persevere in a constantly renewed presentation of the "things which are not seen" as "eternal," as abiding reality. Our aim must be to teach the superior factual existence of the spiritual—including those mental constructions of which we have been thinking—over the merely physical and sensory.

Fortunately we have corroboration from the latest theories of physical science. Such thinkers as Jeans and Eddington seem to be far nearer to an idealistic world-view than would have been conceivable to the leaders of scientific thought of fifty years ago. But the aim of this essay is to suggest an apologetic for this idealism which is independent of those theories; which calls for no specialized knowledge, but works on the material given by our common experience of life. In the light of that idealism we hope to make possible a confidence in the trustworthiness of mental operations which will clear the ground for faith and restore the idea of God to its position as the most real, the finally true, the only completely satisfying knowledge to which man can attain.

C. E. GOSHAWK.

PETER STERRY AND HIS DOCTRINE

IN a manuscript treatise preserved among his unpublished writings at Dr. Williams's Library, Richard Baxter examines what he calls "a method of theologie," "lately revived," "by some deep students who are verst in y^e Platonike Philosophie, & thinke y^t Reason must know more of the Divine Being than

Scripture revealeth." He characterizes such opinions as "a mixture of *Platonisme*, *Origenisme* & *Arianisme* not having all of any of these, but somewhat of *all*." Among such thinkers he places Osiander, Scaliger, Campanella, and "an excellent pious wit Peter Sterry." He is, in fact, describing a type of religious thought which goes back at least to Clement of Alexandria, which is found at the beginning of the Middle Ages in John Scotus Erigena and at the end in Nicholas of Cusa, and which attracted some of the finest minds of Renaissance Italy and seventeenth-century England. It is a philosophy of religion which sees in Christianity the natural outcome and true continuation of the best ancient Greek thought as well as of the religion of the Hebrews, and which, as Baxter rightly says, places Reason (but Reason in the high Platonic sense) above the revelation of Scripture. Baxter's remarks show that he dislikes and distrusts this type of thought. He perceives that, if its premises are accepted, ancient paganism can no longer be regarded as mere idolatry and a deception of the Devil, but as part of a continuous revelation of the Divine Being to mankind. He criticizes adversely in particular Sterry's determinism and his philosophic conception of Christ as "an Universall Soul," and "a top branch in y^e Tree of Being," and applies the term "Pagano-Christian" to his religion. To many modern minds free from Baxter's fundamentalism the very qualities that he condemns will probably serve as a recommendation of Sterry as a thinker, nor will they be particularly alarmed by the statement that "the doctrine draws a little from Origene, & most from Arius, & more [*sic*] from Plato & Averrhois, & most [*sic*] from over-bold conjecturing Reason."

Peter Sterry was born at Southwark in 1613, and was the son of a London merchant. He was educated at Emmanuel College, Cambridge, which he entered in 1629. He took the degrees of B.A., M.A., and B.D., and was elected to a fellowship in 1637. At Cambridge he is said to have been one of the first and most enthusiastic disciples of Benjamin Whichcote, the inaugurator of "Cambridge Platonism." On one occasion Whichcote and Sterry are said to have been "discussing some abstruse points of divinity," when Sterry "explained himself with such ease and clearness that the Doctor [Whichcote] rising from his seat and embracing him, express'd himself in this manner: 'Peter, thou hast overcome me, thou art all pure intellect.'" At the outbreak of the Civil War Sterry threw up his fellowship and joined the Puritan and Parliamentary party. He became chaplain to Robert Greville, Lord Brooke, one of the most vigorous of the Parliamentary leaders, who was killed early in the war, and was nobly eulogized by Milton in *Areopagitica*.

After Lord Brooke's death, Sterry was chosen by the House of Lords as one of its representatives in the famous Westminster Assembly of Divines, where he belonged to the small but distinguished party of Independents who opposed the Presbyterians. He was a friend of Sir Henry Vane and Oliver Cromwell. Under the Commonwealth he was "Preacher to the Council of State," and under the Protectorate one of Cromwell's chaplains. He often preached to the Parliament during the Interregnum, and seven of his official sermons were printed and have survived. His name is coupled with that of Milton in several records, and it is probable that he was intimate with the poet, whose opinions in many respects are closely akin to his own.

After Cromwell's death he became chaplain to Philip Sidney, Viscount Lisle, a liberal-minded and cultured nobleman, and he was granted a special pardon by Charles II. at the Restoration. From this time until his death he appears to have lived in the neighbourhood of London, and to have taught and preached unmolested. He died in November, 1672, and his last words are said to have been, "that it pleased God also to give him full assurance of those Truths he had taught others."

Sterry is as different from the ordinary conception of a Puritan as Milton himself. He seems to have had no strong views about Church government, and the subject is hardly mentioned in his works. On the other hand, he quotes and praises mediæval Catholic philosophers and saints freely. His writings are the products of the lofty imagination of a true poet, and for splendid rhythms and beautiful imagery can only be compared to the prose of Jeremy Taylor, Milton, and Thomas Traherne.

He is an ardent champion of universal toleration, a widely-read scholar, and a lover of beauty in nature, in poetry, in painting, and in music, who believed that all great artists had a share of divine inspiration. Besides the sermons already mentioned, his published works include three important volumes published posthumously, *A Discourse of the Freedom of the Will* (1675), *The Rise, Race, and Royalty of the Kingdom of God in the Soul of Man* (1683), and *The Appearance of God to Man in the Gospel* (1710). He also left a number of unpublished writings in manuscript which are still extant, and were described by the present writer in an article published in *The Review of English Studies* (October, 1930). His published works are rare, but they have always been known to a select company, and their admirers include F. D. Maurice, John Sterling, and Archbishop Trench.

In Baxter's words Sterry was indeed "deeply verst" in the whole Platonic and mystical tradition. He owes much to Plato, especially to the more poetic and imaginative dialogues such as

the *Phædo*, the *Phædrus*, the *Symposium* and the *Timæus*, to the neoplatonism of Plotinus, to the Christian Platonists of Alexandria, to Jewish and possibly to Arabian thought, to the great German mystics of the Middle Ages, a great deal to Nicholas of Cusa, to Ficino and to Campanella, all of whom he quotes by name and eulogizes, and something possibly to Jacob Boehme, some of whose books he seems to have possessed. His doctrine is certainly eclectic, but its eclecticism is a gathering together and reinterpretation of some of the noblest elements in European thought. It may be admitted that he has not the power to weld these elements into a great system or to add any striking original contribution of his own, but it can be claimed that he has left a synthesis of considerable historical interest and great spiritual beauty which looks forward to the best modern idealism, as well as backward to ancient Greece, Alexandria, the Middle Ages, and the Renaissance.

Like his masters, Plotinus, Origen, Erigena and Nicholas of Cusa, Sterry is a strict monist. He believes that only one Being really exists. He calls this Being God, and also "The Universall Being" or "Eternity." His God is the Absolute or Reality of philosophy rather than the God of simple-minded piety. He is described as "True Being, Being itself in its simplicity and *absoluteness*, the first, the supreme, the universall Being . . . the only true Being." The existence of this true Being is proved by the imperfection of all things that we know, since "Nothing that is imperfect can subsist of itself or by itself; for so far as it is imperfect, it is *not*." Just as the Platonic Socrates (the illustration is Sterry's own) would lead his listeners in the *Symposium* from the imperfect beauties of this world to the One True Beauty, so Sterry would lead his readers from the imperfect existence around them to the One True Being which is "All in All, on every side, beneath, above, beyond—all everywhere the same, equally entire, equally undivided . . . that sacred Circle of all Being, whose center is everywhere, whose circumference is no where bounded." It is important, however, to notice that Sterry's God is not, like the God of much spurious Platonism, a mere abstract unity which on the last analysis turns out to be equal to Not-being or zero. He insists again and again in his writings that the unity of God includes multiplicity and variety in the highest degree. "Unity," he writes with true philosophic acumen, "without distinction or variety is a *barrenness*, a melancholy, a blackness of Darkness," "God is not a Broken, Barren, but a perfect and pregnant Unity." He includes in Himself all degrees of Being and even of Not-Being "privations of Being . . . as darkness, night, absence and death." Unity in Diversity may in fact be said to be the

principle that runs through the whole of Sterry's theology. In modern terminology his Absolute, like that of modern idealism, is not abstract Being but Being in its most concrete form. He also conceives the Absolute as dynamic rather than static. He calls God "a Vital Act," "the Fountain of Life," "a Fountain equally unexhaust, a sea unbounded."

Baxter is quite wrong in suggesting that Sterry was an Arian. Unlike Milton, he is a convinced Trinitarian. The number Three is for him the perfect symbol of Unity in Diversity and he sees the rhythm of the triad running through every part of the universe. The first Person of the Trinity is God the Father, the Absolute, pure Being, perfect Unity. The Second Person is the image of the First and the supreme example of "Distinction or Variety," "The First and Fullest *Distinction*," "Variety itself in a most absolute, most entire, most undivided Unity." He is described as "the effulgency of the Divine Glory or Godhead, shining out into an essential Image, a clear distinct Image of it self, in the fulness of its Divine Essence." He is eternally generated by the Father's "contemplation of himself, which is a beatifical Vision of the most beautiful, most blessed *Essence of Essences*." This Christ, the Eternal Son, is the Universe, not the imperfect universe that we know through the senses, but the ideal universe, where all things exist in their true and perfect forms, the World Yonder (*ἐκεῖ*) of Plotinus. "This," writes Sterry, "is the Heaven in which Christ is, or rather which Hee is"; and "Jesus Christ is always in Heaven, Himself is Heaven."

The Eternal Son or Second Person of the Trinity is in fact the actualization of the Absolute. There seems to be a fundamental difficulty here, because it might be asked why, if the Absolute is Reality itself, it stands in need of actualization. Sterry's answer would probably have been that the Son or Ideal Universe is not to be conceived as separate from the Absolute, but as an essential part of it.

Following John Scotus, Erigena and Nicholas of Cusa,* Sterry conceives the Holy Spirit or Third Person of the Trinity as the principle of Love or Union which unites the Father and the Son, the principle of Harmony. "A variety bound up in Unity, an Unity diffusing itself through the Variety." If the Triune God is the only Reality, all other existences from the Angels downward are comparatively unreal, or as Sterry puts it "shadowy." He has a strong sense of the fleetingness and unreality of the phenomenal world. "Fiunt non sunt," he writes of the appearances of this world; "They are sent forth,

* Sterry's whole conception of the Trinity owes much to both of these thinkers and especially to Nicholas of Cusa. See his *De Docta Ignorantia*, passim.

but subsist not"; "They are only in the making, in the same moment in which they are brought forth they are no more." They are compared to the reflections cast by "Heavenly bodies moving over the sea," or by "Buildings standing, Men or horses going on the Earth beside a River," and to "lightning or the shadow in each part of the dial." Yet he recognizes that if phenomena are unreal, they contain an element of reality too, for God, the Absolute, is present in them all. Nature, even Nature seen by our imperfect eyes, is an image of Reality. In one place Sterry calls it "the painted lid before the cabinet," and elsewhere, using a still more beautiful and pregnant metaphor, he writes that "the Creation of the World was a Vail cast upon the Face of God . . . , and God himself seen through it by a kind of dim transparency, as the Sun in a morning, or Mist." In fact, his attitude towards the phenomenal world seems full of contradictions. He had the delight of a true artist in physical beauty, and his pages are filled with lovely imagery drawn from the English landscape. He often speaks of the world of appearances as divinely beautiful, a true manifestation of God. At other times he describes it as utterly evil, a delusion of the Devil, from which we must seek to escape to the true Reality of God. The enigma is solved to some extent, as in most modern systems of idealism, by a doctrine of immanence, which plays a very prominent part in Sterry's teaching and inspires some of his noblest prose: "God is present in every creature. He is present with all the Joys and Glories of Eternity, ever undivided, his own Heaven to himself, in the Depths of Hell beneath, as in the Height of Heaven above, in the Dust of the Brave, in a wave of the sea, as in the most shining Cherubim, or flaming Seraphim." "There is not the lowest thing which hath not God in it, for God fills all. Yet as the Sun-beams fall on a Dung-hill, and are not polluted, but shine on the Dung-hill; so God is still himself to himself, high and glorious in the lowest things." It should be noticed that Sterry guards himself carefully against any confusion of his doctrine with crude pantheism. "Do we make the Creature nothing? Do we make God all? Do we confound God and the Creature?" These are questions which he places in the mouth of an imaginary objector. "Far be it," he answers; ". . . our design and desire is to establish most firmly and clearly the immutable and everlasting bounds between God and the Creature. The Creature truly *really* is in the proper rank and order of its own Being; but all that is, in the presence of the Divine Being, in comparison with it, is like a dream, when one awakes, less than nothing. . . ." "God is not the Creature, yet he is in the Creature, not . . . confined to the Creature . . . or defined

by the Creature, but . . . filling all, in every Creature." Sterry's doctrine of immanence really springs from his profound sense of the presence of wonder and mystery in all things, which finds expression in some notable aphorisms:

"All things in Heaven above, and Earth beneath; meet in the constitution of each Individual."

"Nothing is *mean* and *vile*, seen in a right and universall light."

Sentences like these may be compared with Spinoza's great saying, "The more we understand individual things, the more we understand God." They anticipate Blake's proverb, "Everything that lives is holy." The link between the Absolute and the phenomenal world is found in the Platonic doctrine of ideas. For Sterry the ideas are the perfect forms of all things, "Eternal Truth of Things" in his own words, existing in the Mind of God, which generates them in endless variety and multiplicity. The highest of the Ideas is the Idea of Man which is Christ or the Eternal Son Himself. "Angels and all other Creatures have their distinct Ideas in the Divine Mind. But God Himself in His own essential Image in the person of the Son, the Idea of Ideas is the Idea of Man." All things have their Ideas in the mind of God, but the only Idea which is actualized in the concrete is the highest idea of all, the Eternal Son, who was incarnated as Jesus of Nazareth.*

The incarnation of the Son is the central point in a world history that is governed by the rhythm of the triad. The first creation is called by Sterry "a kind of Incarnation, for in that the Image of God was made flesh." This was the first stage of cosmic evolution, which Sterry calls "the Kingdom of Nature." It is "a shadowy state," beautiful and innocent, but unreal. "All the beauty, Joy and Life of it," he writes, "are the Divine Seede asleep." Man, "the first Adam," was then living in perfect harmony with the other creatures, and was "the Blessed Fountain of Divinity to them." The First Adam was in fact the Kingdom of Nature, for all things exist in the mind of man. This happy Unity was ended by the Fall, which is the work of the Devil, who is the principle of disunion, division, and selfishness: "The Devil is Self Love; a particular being cutting himself off from the rest of things." By the Fall the image of the First Adam or the Kingdom of Nature was shattered: "The frame of Nature within and without us is now a glass broken into so many pieces." "The Image at the Fall vanisheth into a Counterfeit Image, breaking it self into innumerable false Images full of disorders, confusion and contradictions." Yet we must

* Cf. the very similar Christology of Nicholas of Cusa. See *Nicholas of Cusa*, by Henry Bett, pp. 193-200.

notice that Sterry regards the Fall as necessary. Its purpose was in his words to change "the shadowy happiness" of the creature into "a substantial one." It is due to the application of the great principle of Unity in Diversity. The original unity of Nature must be broken up into the greatest diversity before the higher unity of the Spirit can be reached. The achievement of that higher unity is again the work of the Son, who becomes incarnate as Jesus of Nazareth, the perfect man or Idea of Humanity in the concrete. At this point the second stage of World History called the Kingdom of the Son or the Mediator begins. The Crucifixion is the consummation of the process by which God the Absolute is separated from the world. It is the supreme example of Diversity or Variety, and it is necessary in order that Diversity may be complete. At this point "the *Sun* of the eternal Image and glory, having touched the *utmost bound of distance* from it self now begins to return." The Resurrection and Ascension are followed by the Second Coming, which, unlike the First Coming, is Spiritual. The Second Coming is in fact in progress at the present time, and consists of the formation of a new Unity of the Spirit among believers, the Heavenly or Spiritual Man, in place of the shadowy Natural Man, who was destroyed by the Fall. Christ, the Eternal Son, is now a Spirit which "goes out into the spirits of men," and forms "a New Root of Immortality below the Natural Root of each Creature." By participation in this Spirit men become "saints" and together they build up the Heavenly Man or final and complete manifestation of the Son. This process is described in memorable language by Sterry as filling "every point of Time with Eternity, every Spot of Earth with Heaven." When it is complete the Kingdom of the Son or the Mediator will pass into the Kingdom of the Father. All things will then be absorbed into the timeless and spaceless life of the Absolute. But this is not conceived as a Nirvana where all individuality is annihilated. On the contrary, Sterry insists that then, and then only, will each individual find its true being: "The God-head shall not swallow the Creature: nor Heaven Earth. But the Creature and the Earth shall have together a full community in Glory; as distinct a Property and Unity in themselves as God and Heaven." This state is described as "the Heavenly Hierusalem where all things are Fellow Citizens."

Sterry's most important and interesting book, *A Discourse of the Freedom of the Will*, deals with the great problems of Free Will and Determinism, which were debated so much throughout Christendom in his age. Sterry, as a monist, is logically a determinist too, but his determinism is of a very different character from the mechanical and juridical determinism of many

of his puritan contemporaries. He maintains that liberty is simply "a relation or harmony between the essence or Nature of each thing and its operations." It means something different for inanimate objects, for plants, for animals, and for intellectual beings. An arbitrary or indetermined freedom is not true liberty. The will of man is determined from within, not from without. It is "divinely free," when it acts according to its "proper nature," and follows its own "rational inclination to the good." He perceives that the great difficulty in such a theory is the problem of evil, and he boldly admits God's ultimate responsibility for all the sin and evil in the world. He contends, however, that Evil has no real existence, that it is not being, but a "privation of being," and that in order to produce the complete diversity necessary for a perfect universe all degrees of not-being must co-exist with all degrees of being. The weakness of this contention seems to be that it involves the contradiction that, on the one hand, evil is conceived as a necessary part of the universe and even of the Absolute, and, on the other hand, it is said that it has no real existence. So we are faced by the illogical position that something that does not exist is a necessary part of Reality. Sterry is on far stronger ground when he declares that the problem of evil can only be solved by considering God's works as a whole *sub specie æternitatis*. Indeed, he nearly reproduces Spinoza's famous phrase in this connection: "In this light of Eternity alone," he writes, "is the work of God seen aright, in the entire piece, in the whole design from the beginning to the end."

While Sterry had an acute realization of the fact that the existence of evil is the supreme difficulty in any theological system, and devotes much space to it in his *Discourse of the Freedom of the Will*, it cannot be said that he shows any deep feeling in his treatment of the subject. His theory of the Unreality of Evil is part of the neoplatonic tradition, and he would find it amply expounded by such authors as Scotus, Erigena and Nicholas of Cusa. He accepts it wholeheartedly, and it must be admitted that it suits his clear, joyous outlook, which forms a remarkable contrast to the intense and often morbid consciousness of sin that characterizes so many of his contemporaries, as, for example, John Bunyan. To use Matthew Arnold's terminology, he is a Hellenist by temperament, a rare spectacle in the ranks of the Hebraic puritans of the seventeenth century. His ethical teaching, as we should expect, is concerned rather with the good life than with sin. Man is a microcosm containing within himself the image of the whole universe, and the whole divine drama of Creation, Fall, and Redemption is re-enacted in each individual. Every

man and woman is at first a "shadowy image" of nature. That "image" is broken by the principle of Self, which is the Devil. The Believer or "Saint" reintegrates in his or her own mind the "Divine Image" just as the Eternal Son is building up the "Divine Image" or "Heavenly Man" in the universe. The Divine Image in the human mind is boldly declared by Sterry, as by his contemporary John Smith, the Platonist, to be Christ Himself. Ethics are conceived as essentially the discovery of a divine life, a life of spiritual beauty and happiness, "a royal beauty of holiness." The life of the good man has something of the beauty and spontaneity of a great work of art. He is said to live "as a Son under the Gospel," instead of "as a Servant under the Law." He is naturally good, because it is his life to be so. He is a "partaker of the Divine Nature." The divine life is characterized by serenity and joy. Care is said to be a sin, because it "defaces spiritual beauty." The Objector is made to ask if "we may enjoy the delights of the Creature, which is an Inferiour Image." Sterry's answer is full of high wisdom and poetry: "Yes, please thyself to the full with Content. Only let it be no Cloud to cut off; but a Christall to take in the Divine Glory, that this may be thine and flame in them."

Sterry must certainly be classed among the Christian mystics. He held the central belief of Western mysticism that the soul has a "supream part" or "apex" through which it can communicate with God. He uses much of the language of the Catholic mystics, and probably some of his experiences resembled theirs. On the other hand, he appears to me also to have a strong affinity to the mysticism of the Nature poets of the nineteenth century, such as Wordsworth and Shelley, and some of his states of mind seem to be closer to theirs than to the experiences of mediæval saints. He speaks often indeed of the "prayer of quiet," when "every spark of Creature light or Life" is "put out," and "you . . . find yourselves immediately in the presence of God"; at other times he seems, like Wordsworth, to reach a state of beatitude through a heightening or purification of sensuous experience, especially in relation to nature, for which he had a remarkably strong feeling, and which he declares awakens "in the Soule, a certain sense, & Image of an Immortall & Divine State." At such times his vision becomes intensified until all things are irradiated and aglow with a heavenly light, so that they appear, in his own great phrase, as "a New World of Glories." This is an experience which is surely less akin to the visions of the old saints than to the "bliss ineffable" of Wordsworth, when he

" . . . felt the sentiment of Being spread
O'er all that moves and all that seemeth still."

Peter Sterry was a prophet of unity and peace, of sweetness and light in an age of bitter civil and religious strife. In another period of conflict and confusion it may not be unprofitable to turn to the writings of this forgotten Englishman of the seventeenth century, who surely deserves an honourable place in the great line of Christian Platonists which extends from Origen and Clement of Alexandria to Malebranche and Berkeley.

V. DE SOLA PINTO.

THE YOUNG PEOPLE IN OUR COUNTRY PARISHES

"How can we keep our young people? One by one I find them slipping away after confirmation." Such was the recent complaint of a country priest. "Youth today has no place for religion," said a young man a short while ago to the writer of this article. "Youth simply isn't interested." Is it possible to keep our young people? Can we interest them in religion? We certainly shall not do the first without the second. The present writer believes we can do both. This paper deals with work amongst young people in country parishes; similar results can be obtained, and are being obtained, in town parishes with slightly varying arrangements but a similar method. What then can we do to interest our young people and keep them loyal to our Lord and to His Church?

I.—PROVIDE THE RIGHT ATMOSPHERE

First of all, we must provide the right atmosphere where young persons may be trained in spiritual matters. The church may be poor, but as God's House it must be tidy, clean, and well ordered. The services must be bright, with the attraction of a quiet sense of comfort, orderliness, and reality. Heaviness and disorder should be swept out with the cobwebs. The church must always be the gate of Heaven, and Heaven is never a place for gloom, spiritual emptiness, dulness, and disorder. Heaven is a place where God is, and the church must be that delightful happy spot where people, young and old, are learning to find Him. The priest, moreover, must be well known in the homes of the young people, ever ready to be the friend of the whole parish. It is useless to say "I will concentrate on children" and then ignore the older folk. The winning of the older folk must at least be attempted and many of them won before really satisfactory work with young people can be accomplished.

The priest's manner, too, with his young people, must be of

an entirely happy kind. He must be bright and cheery with an ever ready smile, never "upset" or "put out." Reproofs when necessary should be given firmly and kindly with a complete absence of personal feeling. There must, of course, be no favourites and no spoiling. While the priest is to have the young heart of a helpful elder brother, he must yet never forget that his office is that of a father, and as such he must be respected. It is hardly necessary to add that in order to help to produce a right atmosphere the priest must first and above all else be a man of prayer. No amount of organizing ability or of friendly relationship with his young people will make up for an absence of real spirituality. The priest's frequent communions, daily meditation, regular use of the Sacrament of Penance and annual retreat must always take the first place. "Why do you not go to St. Blank's?" a young man was recently asked, and gave the immediate reply: "Because there is nothing in it. The vicar says, 'Do as I tell you, not do as I do.'" Young people discover our spiritual emptiness sooner perhaps than their elders do, and they will certainly leave us when we have nothing to give them.

II.—PROVIDE FOR THEIR REAL NEEDS

Is not one great reason why we often lose our young people, that we are out of touch with their lives and try to give them what they do not want. "I always begin my confirmation classes," said a town priest, "with talks on the covenant." Could anything be more unreal? It has no point of contact with the child's life. What do our young people who come to us for confirmation preparation, and others who do not come, really want? Perhaps it seems sometimes that many of them do not want anything at all. The reason for this is, generally speaking, that we have not begun early enough. They had a want which we failed to supply and which is now passed or passing. There is in all our children a feeling after God and a consciousness of sin, very elementary perhaps sometimes, but quite sufficient for our purpose and capable of healthy development with the most happy results if dealt with on the right lines and taken in time. Parents and teachers can help in this, but the only really satisfactory work can be done by the priest. Every boy and girl of nine or ten years old at latest should begin to know their priest and receive instruction from him. The child's feeling for God should be satisfied by careful teaching as regards prayer and worship. He should be taught again and again how to pray and how to join in worship, and make a definite rule of life as to morning and evening prayers and attendance every Sunday at the Lord's service. It is hardly

necessary to add that no priest in his sober senses would for one moment tolerate the attendance of children at Sunday Mattins.

The children should be allowed to come on their own to church and not be marshalled in. If they are worshipping with their elders, places could be reserved for them in different parts of the church. Every child should be provided with a hymn book and simple book of prayers for use at the Eucharist so that they can follow the service intelligently. The sermon if children are encouraged to be present should not exceed ten minutes. Many of their elders will be grateful for this brevity.

The child's innermost consciousness of sin should be helped by a very careful instruction on the harm sin does to our souls, what it cost our Blessed Lord, the necessity of repentance, and the value and power of absolution. Then the child should be told quite simply, more than once if necessary, how to make his or her confession and the time and place agreed on as to when it should be made. There will be no difficulty about this if the teaching is given in a clear and interesting manner. Young people love to do things and to be told how to do them. Here is something for them to do which vitally affects their own souls, and they know it. The eagerness and frequency with which they make their confessions, especially the boys, is often remarkable. If it be said that parents will object, the answer is that they may do so at first, but when the priest is known and trusted in the parish all objections will disappear. The seal of confession must be very clearly understood, as also the obligation of the penitent never to commit the great sin of concealing a sin. The former was well put by a boy aged ten: "The priest can't tell anyone and God won't."

The priest must be easily accessible to his young people in this matter. Definite times for confessions must be arranged—after school in the afternoon, Saturday night after evensong, after a morning week-day service which the children attend if there is a day school. It must be known too that other times are possible; a room near the club-house, or a chapel in the Rectory will be often in request. "I can't come on Saturdays," said a young man to the present writer a few minutes before this paragraph was penned; "will you tell me please when you can see me in church."

When the priest has once got his young people to regular confession he must not let them go. Anything now is possible—confirmation candidates, zealous churchmen and churchwomen, clean moral lives, and, above all, faithful and devoted followers of our Lord Jesus Christ. The children come first to the priest and then he hands them on to the Master. This is the really great work. Everything must give way before it; all the pet

schemes of the up-to-date parson, meetings, committees, conferences, and the many modern inducements to get a man away from his parish—these must take second and third place. The priest is a pastor, and now he has found his life's work: it is "to write in souls." He will love his children with a wonderful spiritual love and they will love him too. Youth longs for friendship, and what a friend in need can often be a faithful, godly, loving priest to whom youth can and will pour out in the confessional the innermost secrets of the heart!

III.—USE THE GANG INSTINCT

Once having got your young people, not only must they not be allowed to slip away, but they must be given an extensive course of spiritual training leading on to Confirmation and Holy Communion. This is best done by Guilds which foster the spiritual life of the unconfirmed in a perfectly normal and healthy way, and which also provide for them in the difficult days after confirmation. It is helpful to dedicate the first Guild these young people join to the Holy Child, putting before them continually the purity, beauty, and happiness of the Holy Child Jesus, their Model and Guide. This Guild will have for its members a rule of life of daily morning and evening prayer, attendance at the Lord's Service on Sunday, and regular confession. It should be made quite clear at the start that this is the rule for all, and no boy or girl should be admitted until they have been thoroughly tested as to the keeping of this rule. It is an advantage to divide up the Guild into teams of five or six, with a leader chosen by themselves in charge of the team. The leader should be a little older than his fellows, or at least a reliable person. Guild meetings should be held from time to time to give the opportunity of fresh inspiration, and to enable the priest to look up any slack members.

When the confirmation time comes round the priest will find he no longer has to hunt up confirmation candidates, nor to persuade children to be confirmed. They are ready and anxious for another step forward in the spiritual life. A paper and pencil may be placed in church for the children to write their names under the simple declaration: "I wish to be confirmed." It is delightful to see the response.

Guilds will, of course, be provided for boys and girls separately after confirmation. The newly confirmed will probably want to join these at once, but it is as well to keep them waiting. The time of waiting gives an opportunity for further instruction, for occasional private talks, and for testing as to the regularity with which the new rule they will be making on admission is kept during the time of probation. The new rule, of course,

includes frequent communion, as well as regular prayer, worship, and confession. The present writer has found it a fairly simple matter to get children to frequent confession, but not so easy to get them to frequent communion. It is here, of course, that most boys and girls slip away. Under the methods described above they keep up their first rule, in which they have been grounded for perhaps two, three, or four years, and they pass gradually to a rule of life which includes frequent communion. Some, of course, fall quite naturally to the communicant rule, others find it more difficult; these generally come from homes where religious practices are not easily kept up, especially going out before breakfast on Sunday morning.

When the time comes for the boys and girls to pass into their respective Communicant Guilds, they should be admitted and make at a public service in church their solemn promise of regular prayer, communion, worship, and confession. Combined services of the Guilds should be held at such festivals. Services for the boys' and girls' Communicant Guilds separately should be held from time to time, and here again an excellent opportunity is afforded to the priest to look up any slack members. A private talk at such a time is regarded as quite a normal procedure, and causes no feeling of resentment.

When the young people have left school and gone to work, it will not always be so easy for them to get to confession. Here again the priest must be entirely at their disposal. If they have been well trained there will be no slackening off at this, perhaps, the most critical time of their lives; indeed, some of them desire more frequent confession after they have left school. Let them know the priest is ready to receive and welcome them at any time that they are able to come.

There will, of course, be some occasional disappointments, but these will be amply compensated for by encouragements, which are, indeed, numerous, so long as the priest never fails in prayer and patience. The opportunities which this work affords are boundless, and a source of unfailing happiness to the priest. Young, impressionable, and precious souls are placed in his care by the Good Shepherd to tend and train for Him. The romance of the confessional! Wonderful indeed! Lives transformed, passions conquered, wayward wills bent towards the Divine Will, and weak wills strengthened; only God, His angels and the priest know the story of lives transformed. May God make us less unworthy of the great task He has entrusted to us.

One brief word in conclusion. The priest must pray for his young penitents by name daily. He must spend some time every day in the study of moral and ascetical theology.

R. D. MIDDLETON.

MISCELLANEA

NOTES AND COMMENTS

CANON QUICK, in the letter from him which we publish below, puts his question with commendable brevity; and, since it would take a considerable time for the Bishop of Colombo's answer to reach us, we propose to give our own reply, for what it is worth. Of the three views which Canon Quick gives as conceivable, the second represents our own mind; though instead of "it is impossible to say" we should be content to write "it is doubtful." Further, that is what we mean when we say that we regard such sacraments as "invalid"; and the word seems to us, *pace* Canon Quick, quite a good one. The ground of our doubt is that, since the Eucharist is the Church's central and characteristic act of worship, it would appear to be necessary that it should be celebrated by someone duly authorized to represent the Church; and such due authorization appears to be lacking in the case of those not episcopally ordained. In the scholastic theology a convenient distinction was made between *ordo* and *jurisdictio*: both were normally necessary for the celebration of a sacrament, but it was sometimes claimed that the absence of *jurisdictio* only caused the sacrament to be "irregular," while the absence of *ordo* made it "invalid." In the present case, however, Canon Quick and the Indian authorities seem to invert the relative order of importance of these two requirements, and it is claimed that *jurisdictio* can supply the defect of *ordo*. So far as we know, no authority exists for such a view.

One might also ask Canon Quick whether he would regard baptism as a necessity in one who celebrates the Eucharist. Only a year or two ago one of the Joint Chairmen of the Congregational Union of England and Wales was a well-known minister, who had never been baptized. The case is probably rare; but it illustrates the measure of legitimate doubt imposed upon us, once the settled order of the Church is abandoned.

We published over a year ago a translation by the Archdeacon of St. Albans of a Latin prayer of Mary Queen of Scots; but the Archdeacon was unable then to trace the original. He has now, however, done so, and has kindly sent us the information. The original was found in the Queen's Missal, known as the Lobanoff Missal, now at Leningrad, and it had been bought on a bookstall after the French Revolution in Paris with the binding torn off. The Latin is also reprinted in *Queen Mary's Book*, edited by Mrs. Stuart Mackenzie Arbuthnot, and is translated by Swinburne in his play "Mary Stuart."

Dr. Prideaux, who contributed to THEOLOGY some charming translations of "The Odes of Solomon" (since published), has submitted the following

SUGGESTED ALTERNATIVE ENDING TO THE *Te Deum*

Thou, Holy Spirit : come in thy sevenfold might;
Give us life : show us the way of holiness.
Fire our hearts : lead us into the truth;
Give us wisdom, give us love : and the fear of the Lord.
Strengthen us, Lord : and help all our infirmities;
Enable us his children : to cry unto our Father.

Intercede thou for us : pledge of our inheritance;

Set us free : and sanctify.

In peace and joy and righteousness: give glory now and evermore.

Note.—Students have for some time realized that the *Te Deum* ends with the words "in glory everlasting," and that what follows in the usual versions is merely a collection of versicles taken from the Psalms. It has not always been realized what scant recognition is given in the Church's devotions to the Third Person of the Holy and Blessed Trinity, and in this respect the *Te Deum* is as deficient as any. Greatly presuming, I have dared to suggest an alternative ending, with the view of remedying this defect. The thoughts and language are all taken from the New Testament and are accordingly of Christian origin, and they may therefore be deemed preferable to the weak and pointless catena of phrases from the Hebrew Psalms. The wording possesses the same number of syllables and cadences as the existing ending, and can therefore be sung to any of the usual musical settings.

Among contributors to the present issue, the Rev. R. H. Moberly is Principal of Bishop's College, Cheshunt, and a son of the late Professor Moberly of Oxford. The Rev. C. E. Goshawk is Vicar of St. Mary Magdalene's, Sunderland, and Dr. Pinto is Professor of English at University College, Southampton. The Rev. R. D. Middleton is Vicar of Lower Hardres, near Canterbury, and is known to our readers as the reviewer of the *British Museum Quarterly* and other periodicals.

CORRESPONDENCE

I

DEAR SIR,

August 12, 1932.

The Bishop of Colombo contributes a most moving article to this month's THEOLOGY. But, at the risk of seeming unsympathetic, I think it ought to be pointed out once more that the policy of Anglo-Catholics in regard to such schemes for union as the South Indian is bound to be perplexing and ambiguous in principle, until they have made up their minds quite definitely as to what is the status of a service of Holy Communion celebrated with sufficient "form and matter" by a minister not episcopally ordained. Three views are conceivable: (1) That such a service, though a means of grace to those who in good faith take part in it, is not the Eucharist at all; (2) that it is impossible to say whether it is the Eucharist or not; (3) that it is really the Eucharist, but not ministered with the due authorization of the Church, or in full accordance with the Church's divinely appointed order.

Now I think it is obvious on reflection that the first two views, though distinct from one another in theory, ought to have the same result in practice. And the result must be that in no conceivable circumstances must a member of the Anglican Church be allowed to receive communion at the hands of a minister not episcopally ordained; and nothing whatever must be done which could reasonably be held to imply that the Service ministered by one not episcopally ordained has been recognized as being the Eucharist at all. In that case, surely the South Indian Scheme stands condemned in principle from the start.

If, on the other hand, the Service of Holy Communion ministered by one not episcopally ordained is simply an insufficiently or improperly authorized Eucharist, then a quite different line of action will be appro-

priate. True, nothing must even now be done which would give the impression that Anglicans regard the essential rules of the Church's episcopal order as unimportant or a matter of indifference. But "in cases of necessity"—as, *e.g.*, when an Anglican is inevitably cut off from the ministrations of his own Church—it would seem obviously right that he should be encouraged, if he has the opportunity, to receive communion from a non-episcopal body. Again, on such a principle of doctrine, schemes for union of the South Indian type are clearly justifiable; and, if the bodies which are parties to such a scheme have clearly agreed that after a certain period the rules which are essential to episcopal order shall cover the whole reunited body, then in the interim Anglo-Catholics may well tolerate a great deal of what they must think to be "irregularity"; since in virtue of the agreement it will be recognized that this "irregularity" is only a temporary and exceptional expedient, and the necessary principle of episcopal order will be safeguarded as a principle.

I have no knowledge of the facts which would enable me to say how these considerations would apply to the actual situation in South India at the present time. The question what, in view of general principles, ought to be done must of course, in any case, be left to the authorities on the spot. But when the Bishop of Colombo appeals to principle, he ought, I think, to explain clearly and fully what the principle is. It is not enough to say that "it is wrong in principle to depart from the Anglican rule that the celebrant of the Holy Communion is to be a priest," when the whole question of principle concerns the meaning of the rule, and the ground and scope of the obligation which it imposes. What are they? That is the whole point.

I am,

Yours very truly,

OLIVER C. QUICK.

P.S.—I have purposely abstained from the use of the words "valid" and "validity," which are ambiguous in meaning and, unless they are analyzed and defined at length, only serve to befog what is in essentials a perfectly plain issue.

II

PEMBROKE COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE.

August 4, 1932.

DEAR SIR,

I have been doing some reading at the Bodleian Library in correspondence connected with the Nonjurors, and coming across the enclosed I thought it might perhaps interest you and your readers. It is from a letter written to Dr. Thomas Brett, one of the later generation of the Nonjuror bishops in 1721, by one Robert Montgomerie in answer to a request from Brett to do what he could for a Mr. Calder. Montgomerie replies that he does not think that he knows the gentleman, unless he be a Calder he came across in the circumstances narrated in the extract. I copied the extract out from its own intrinsic interest, both from the point of view of the language and also the light it gives on a church practice of the early eighteenth century. I have found other correspondents of Brett referring to "the Blessed Sacrament." I leave the style and punctuation as in the original, save that I have had to substitute the modern for the ancient "S."

Yours sincerely,

(REV.) N. H. J. BANTING.

(Brett) MSS. relating to Ten Nonjurors. Bodleian Library MSS., Eng. Theol., c. 27, vol. iv., folio 187.

"I remember about 2 yeares agoe That Dr. Gadderar came for me to give ye blessed Sacrament to a Gentleman That Laid a dyeing & who was right in his principles of Ch & State & whom he hade Known beyond seas & studyed Anatomy & dissections etc with him & That he design'd to get his Uncle to give him ye Sacrament wⁿ he Came home from Kensington at Night. But he was affraid Mr. Calder should dy befor night therefor begg'd ye favor of me to goe wth him Imediatly accordingly I went & found ye Gentleman so very weak That he Could scarce speak. I spoke to him about his soul's Case & told him I was a Nonjuror That if he Expected ye bl. Sacrament from me he Must promise to Continue Constant to my Communion w^{ch} he promised to doe Then I Call'd for a Glass of pure water a halfepenny Roll & a Little Wine & went on wth ye Communion Office & wⁿ he Recover'd I Call'd Upon him to Come to prayers & Gave him written directiones" (i.e., to find the Nonjuror's chapel). But he never came, and Montgomerie has not seen him since.

NOTES

(1) *The Truro Diocesan Gazette*.

This *Gazette* is always worth reading for the independence and candour of its judgments on current events, and the September number is no exception to the rule. The writer of an article entitled "This Church of England" does us the honour of referring at length to the Editorial Notes in our July issue. Approving on the whole, he considers that our criticisms of a section of the Catholic movement were too brief to be quite fair, since they did not go behind the facts to the cause of them. This cause he finds, quoting some weighty words of Dean Church, in the one-sided temper which has marked the administration of the Church of England in the past century. He admits that there has been marked improvement, but calls for "a great act of amends generous and complete" on the part of "the leaders of the Church" in connection with next year's Centenary. From time to time in these columns, as occasion seemed to require it, we have ourselves repeated the substance of Dean Church's protest. But we greatly hope that the call for repentance in connection with the forthcoming centenary will be addressed, first and foremost, to the Catholic movement itself. We shall have opportunity later, perhaps, to enlarge upon this point; for the moment we can only say that, in our view, the whole future of the Catholic movement will turn upon the reality and thoroughness with which it reconsiders its own achievements and outlook.

With regard to St. Hilary, the admirable letter which Lord Hugh Cecil contributed to the *Church Times* is reproduced in full; and we entirely concur in his plea that the problem of church ornaments is properly an administrative and not a legal one. Stiffkey and St. Hilary have made it plain that the household of God is tragically lacking in administrative resources; and the attempt to substitute legal processes for them can only end in disaster and scandal. Under the title of "Axes and Hammers" there is an excellent and well-written article on the sacrilege at St. Hilary which serves greatly to reinforce Lord Hugh Cecil's criticisms and suggestions. A beautiful poem entitled "St. Hilary, August, 1932" breathes the spirit which inspires that Cornish church and its congregation.

(2) *St. Peter and St. Paul.*

The twentieth century is witnessing what for two and a half hundred years has been almost unknown in Europe, a keen desire for greater unity in worship and doctrine. Men whose memories can take them back for over eighty years can well remember when fresh divisions among professed believers in Christ were hailed as signs of devotion, development and new vigour of life, proofs that the Gospel was at last making way with the whole people. But a great change has come over the scene during the last ten years or so. Many have become indifferent to the calls and devotions at one time associated with "religion"; a sense of unreality has taken its place and with it a suspicion that beneath the varieties of form adopted by the professors thereof there must be some essentials, some fundamentals only needing adequate proclamation to win more common assent. In short, that whilst men seemed to be hunting for newer methods, they were really only seeking for a sounder way of return to those first principles from which they had started, but had lost touch with in the resultant confusion. We have been told to find our way "back to Christ," a direction which has no meaning unless we are told what Christ and what the revelation He made.

History does not repeat itself. Yet to history we must always turn to discover the workings of principles, and there is no age without its witness for our guidance in the present. The Church began her career with dispute; in the same condition she has gone on ever since, but with the difference that the subject of dispute has never been exactly reproduced. It is as though the Almighty had thrown down point after point for men to discuss and settle until they had reached a conclusion once for all time. In the Old Testament we have many covenants between man and God, as well as between man and man, recorded, but the greatest was the Covenant of which Circumcision was the outward sign. We find it adopted by many races at different eras, but reaching its highest significance with the Jews whose conception of God Himself was the highest ever known before the Incarnation. When Saul began his ministry at Damascus and Jerusalem he aroused hostility because his teaching must have involved abolition of the sign of the Old Covenant and its supersession by the spiritual sign of the New Covenant, to which it had always pointed. The Hellenists were the fiercer in their hostility since their contact with the Gentile world made them more sensitive as to the results. St. Barnabas gave his generous aid to the new teacher. St. Peter was called into question on his return from Cæsarea, where he had seen the Holy Ghost poured out upon uncircumcised Gentiles as upon the circumcised apostles on the Day of Pentecost. "Who was I that I could withstand God?" John Mark sided with the Hellenists when he ran away from Perga home to Jerusalem. A little later at Antioch came the climax, and nothing less than a decision of the Holy Ghost, and the Church in Council, could avail to establish the removal of the Old Covenant sign in favour of the New. "I resisted (Cephas) to the face, because he stood condemned," and with him Barnabas and the rest. That fear of what may happen which led the head of the Church of the Circumcision to deny his Lord, led him once more to deny the teaching given by Christ to him personally at Joppa and Cæsarea. St. Paul required that the two heads of the Church should be equally consistent, and not contradict each other. And he won. He might be hard to understand, but he spoke the truth, and it is the truth that makes us free. The contest in the Catholic Church

ended in victory on one point once for all, "for it seemed good to the Holy Ghost, and to us," and finality once assured remains. The Council at Jerusalem was not only first in time but of importance, showing how all questions should be dealt with, and left for settlement with the Lord, the Giver of Life, the Guide into all the truth. We have the promise, can we not be content therewith?

There are still other dissensions keeping us apart, conferences are being held, and men are busily studying the views of their neighbours. Well and good. But is it wise to act as if sufficient conference had been held, or as if a conclusion of a part of the whole Body of Christ were equal to the conclusion of the whole guided by the Holy Spirit? Canon Lacey in his work on Herbert Thorndike has shown the unwisdom of thus proceeding. If we may take history as a guide, it would seem that all questions of episcopal Authority and Jurisdiction ought not to be raised once more, for from the first century to the middle of the sixteenth it has never been a matter of dispute; St. Ignatius and St. Clement are witnesses. But there is another ministry, the Prophetic, which remains yet to be fully discussed, of which we have apostolic witness that it was founded by our Lord, and, from history, still waits for His decision. Diligent search through a large number of works proves that no one has so far been able to trace out the disappearance of the Prophetic office. All that can be established is that from the second century onwards, it seems to have been at least ineffective, although why and how no one can determine. We sing of the "goodly fellowship" of the prophets; do we recognise it as on a level with the "glorious company of the apostles"? For a study of the question we recommend attention to Bishop Joyce's paper in Dr. Gore's *New Commentary*, p. 706, where, although he limits himself on some particulars, he is satisfactory on others. There is nothing more complete so far as it goes than the treatment of New Testament prophecy in this paper. It should be supplemented by Dr. W. K. L. Clarke's chapter in *Episcopacy Ancient and Modern* (S.P.C.K.), who says, p. 46, that "room must be found for a prophetic succession, intermittent though it be, as well as for Apostolic Succession." Things different must not be confused, as they have been on this subject by writers on both sides. The complete forgetfulness of the Prophetic Succession has nowhere been more manifest than in the way the Roman Church has ignored St. Paul from the third century onwards, for, as Professor C. H. Turner said in his *Catholic and Apostolic Papers*, p. 224, etc., in primitive times neither the Roman Church itself, nor Christians from outside, ever thought of suppressing St. Paul. But in the third century the change came and the name of Peter began to be used alone. Churchmen in the sixteenth century probably failed to suspect that they were fighting for the recovery of a Prophetic Succession, yet it was that for which they laboured and we have to carry on the struggle. St. Peter knew and wrote in both his epistles of the "sure word of prophecy"; St. Paul laid similar stress on that ministry of the Word, for both knew of its importance and permanence, and never hinted that it would be forsaken except under evil influences. Well for the peace of the Church that we should give ourselves to the formal recovery of this lost succession; it can be done if only we see that it possesses a claim of its own and is not bound up with Apostolic succession.

But the recovery must be by an act of the Church, not by local discussions only, however necessary the smaller preparatory meetings are, and in this act we must ask the Holy Spirit to guide us so that the decision may be final.

A. T. F.

REVIEWS

ENGLISH PULPIT ORATORY FROM ANDREWES TO TILLOTSON.
A Study of its Literary Aspects. By W. Fraser Mitchell.
S.P.C.K. 21s.

This is a guide-book to English pulpit oratory of the seventeenth century, and, like Bradshaw's *Continental Guide*, falls into two parts, the one descriptive, the other tabular. In the first 400 pages the author describes the nature of the material available and the literary forms used by sermon-writers, providing copious illustrations from the Anglo-Catholic preachers, the other Anglicans, the non-Anglicans, the Cambridge Platonists, the Latitudinarians, and the Restoration preachers. The remainder of the book is taken up with a bibliography revealing the amazing extent of the author's reading, and an index so competently drawn up that it forms one of the most interesting parts of the book.

Mr. Fraser Mitchell has earned our gratitude by stepping out from the beaten track of Church history into an interesting bypath, wherein his wanderings shed new light upon the development of English oratory, literature, history, and religion. He has selected a century when the pulpit held much the same position that the newspaper now occupies, and when the church rather than the cinema and the stadium drew the largest popular gatherings. The English Church in the seventeenth century preached to the whole nation, and of the topics that agitated men's minds at that time we can hardly find a more effective mirror than the sermons delivered in the course of public worship. If the mentality of an age is best known by the character of its monuments, then these sermons constitute a monument of the English mentality of the seventeenth century—of an age when learning still remained predominantly in the possession of the clergy.

In his foreword the author modestly excuses himself for setting out at such length the material he has examined, on the ground that "no one is likely, for a considerable period at least, to desire to re-examine it." We think this claim is just, and are reminded of the manner in which Mr. Elihu Root is said to have proposed the toast of the Pilgrim Fathers, asking leave to include the Pilgrim Mothers, "who had to put up with the Pilgrim Fathers." Mr. Fraser Mitchell has shown marvellous patience in reading millions of dull words in the pursuit of literary needles in haystacks. And in this self-imposed task he has directed his researches in pursuit of the development of English prose, recognizing that in the composition of the written essays

that then passed for sermons lies an abundant supply of material.

His primary interest, then, is that of the man of letters rather than of the theologian; we must not, therefore, look into his pages for a treatise on the development of post-Reformation religion, but must be satisfied with picking up theological crumbs by the wayside. The form, not the content, of the myriad sermons he has examined is his main concern.

And in this study of form he reaches a very definite conclusion. He claims for Tillotson the honour of bringing simple, straightforward English prose to perfection, and so robs the secular writers of this honour, and crowns the perfection of English prose with the wreath of sanctity. "Thus prose," he concludes, "was at length rendered plain and serviceable, yet not without beauty or elegance, and suited to any task which Englishmen might in future impose, being first perfected in the hands of Tillotson and other divines as might best tend *ad maiorem Dei gloriam*."

Within the limits of a short review it is impossible to follow the author in his perspicuous analysis of the matter and form of the seventeenth-century English sermons. We must content ourselves with noting one or two characteristics of these voluminous orations. We observe in the first place how the Reformation was part of a new current of culture in the Western world. It is not merely scripture which interests the ecclesiastical orators: their sermons reveal a lively interest in physiology and natural history, in the ancient classics, and in the writings of the Fathers. In all this they show affinities with, for instance, the contemporary French preachers. The atmosphere in which Jeremy Taylor moves is the atmosphere of St. Francis de Sales. Reformation and Counter-Reformation join hands in loving regard for the realm of Nature. And secondly, at the beginning of our period the English preachers remain victims of their early education; they cannot shake off the love of rhetoric learned in universities still dominated by the scholastic outlook. The sermons of Andrewes and the "witty" preachers are largely syllogisms from Scripture, their principal aim is exegesis, they serve rather to convince the mind than to move the heart. It was only when, by the time of the Restoration, the religious, historical, and scientific knowledge of the Bible had become generally diffused, and curiosity had become sated, that the pulpit orators were in a position to revise both their matter and the form of its delivery. The human mind had wearied of arid theological disputations, the current controversies had failed to promote the highest ends of religion; the rise of the Latitudinarian school was therefore inevitable—it moved the

centre of religion from controversy to conduct. Before we sneer at the moral platitudes of Tillotson, let Mr. Mitchell remind us that he prepared himself for the pulpit by "a deep and close study of the Scriptures"; that he studied next "all the Philosophers and Books of Morality," and that among the Fathers "St. Basil and St. Chrysostom were those he chiefly read" (p. 334). This tendency to shift the emphasis on to personal religion had its counterpart also in the great French preachers. Anyone who will read Massillon's pages will recognize his eager desire to get away from controversy and to appeal to the human heart.

Another characteristic of all this preaching is the almost total neglect of the illiterate masses. Most of the sermons presuppose an audience of a quasi-university intellectual standard. The appeals to the classical languages, the tags of Hebrew, the citations from the Fathers, the illustrations drawn from the science of the day—all these do but emphasize restriction of knowledge within the bounds of a small intellectual oligarchy, and go far to explain the apathy of the common people towards the Established Church. Nor would the triumph of the Puritan element have conveyed any advantage. Their sermons were more arid than those of the orthodox divines. Dissent remained a numerically negligible factor until the advent of the Wesleys, and even they only succeeded in bringing home the truths of revealed religion to the lower strata of the middle class. In England institutional religion has never touched the lives of the very poor in the manner that is to be seen in Ireland or in Brittany.

These considerations indicate something of the new field opened out by Mr. Fraser Mitchell's laborious researches. His great work cannot be recommended for light reading, but no library can afford to be without it. It is, as we said before, a guide-book, and a guide-book presupposes that the reader will visit the territories treated of. In the appeal to the human heart the preaching of the twentieth century is immeasurably superior to that of the seventeenth, but this advantage is often endangered by a tendency to degenerate into subjective sentimentality. In the splendid objectivity of their presentation, in the majestic rhythmic cadences of their periods, in the intense application of their preparation, the Caroline orators have much to teach us. We say, then, let us take Mr. Mitchell's guide in hand and turn back to the oratory of our forefathers. Yet as we do so, we are aware that the sermons of Donne, of South, and of Barrow and Tillotson—to single out a few illustrious names—are not readily accessible. Nor would it repay us to make a study of all their sermons. In 1844,

Richard Cattermole brought out two volumes of select sermons of representative Anglican divines under the title *Literature of the Church of England*. What we now want, and we should like to make a draft on Mr. Fraser Mitchell's unique learning for the purpose, is a similar work, with the sermon texts suitably annotated and analyzed. Meanwhile, for those who think the proclamation of the Gospel worthy of the highest diligence, and are ready to bestow the highest pains, we recommend a study of *English Pulpit Oratory*, at the same time expressing our gratitude to its author for opening out a fresh field of study which may conceivably give a new direction to English preaching.

J. L. BEAUMONT JAMES.

THE CATHOLIC FAITH. By Paul Elmer More. Princeton University Press, and (for Great Britain) Humphrey Milford, Oxford University Press. 24s.

CHRISTIAN MYSTICISM: A CRITIQUE. A reprint of Ch. V. of the above. S.P.C.K. 3s. 6d.

Dr. More has written a series of books on "The Greek Tradition"; the several titles are *The Religion of Plato*, *Hellenistic Philosophies*, *The Christ of the New Testament*, *Christ the Word*; then come two supplementary volumes, *Platonism* and *The Catholic Faith*.

Dr. More is a Christian Platonist, and his point of view is somewhat as follows. Plato is profoundly right in his doctrine of Ideas or Forms, which are not, like the Aristotelian Forms, mere universals, such as the Idea man, or the Idea table; they are rather the ideas of ethical qualities, such as beauty, good, courage, and therefore have contraries—ugliness, evil, cowardice. Plato is perfectly sure that they have a real existence of their own. Beautiful things are really beautiful, because they participate in the Idea of beauty; there is a "real presence" of the Idea in the thing (*The Catholic Faith*, pp. 150 ff., 215 ff.; *Christian Mysticism*, p. 13 ff.). All genuine Platonism holds to this strict dualism between the Idea and the thing, between the eternal and the temporal. But Aristotle, by dissolving away this dualism into the distinction of form and matter, substitutes for the transcendent reality of the Good a variety of individual goods which may be attained by particular things; hence any theory of good and evil must start from what the particular good man does (*C.F.*, p. 223 ff.; *C.M.*, p. 22 ff.). But what is the relation of this relative good to ultimate Good? Aristotle is obliged to posit this Good as an Absolute, "a goal of absolute goodness utterly unattainable by any individual

of this world," as "pure energy with no potentiality of becoming anything, a pure causality which yet of itself causes nothing, a *telos* at which nothing arrives" (*C.F.*, p. 226 f.; *C.M.*, p. 25 f.).

Hence, while the Platonist theologian thinks of revealed doctrine as the real but imperfect revelation of Divine truth, Aristotelians miss this living and strong conception; believing in a revelation, they must needs interpret it as an absolute revelation, expressed either in an inerrant Bible or in an infallible Church. Both these claims, being readily disprovable, lead to scepticism; both are "victims of the Demon of the Absolute, whose influence is perhaps the most subtly malign of all the idols set up for worship by the human race" (*C.F.*, p. 177).

The same conception underlies Dr. More's treatment of Mysticism. *The Catholic Faith* contains in Ch. I. a sympathetic study of Buddhism, which ends with the suggestion that the noble teaching of the Buddha failed just at this point; it failed to maintain the absolute and radical dualism between man and the eternal, and blurred it into an "absolved dualism," a conception of an absorption of finite being into the infinite. "It seems to me at times as if that great soul were searching on all the ways of the spirit for the dogma of the Incarnation," which, if it could have been known to him, would just have saved him and his successors from helpless floundering among vanishing shadowy myths (*C.F.*, pp. 66, 75).

In the chapter on Christian Mysticism the forms of Mysticism are thus diagrammatically presented (*C.F.*, p. 208 ff.; *C.M.*, p. 6 ff.):

1. "Mystihood" (Walter Hilton's term): Ideal, as seen in Plato.
Christian, as seen in Gregory Nazianzen.
2. Mysticism: Quasi-, as seen in Augustine.
Mixed, as seen in John of the Cross.
3. Mysticism: Absolute, as seen in Plotinus.

These forms shade into one another. To begin with Plato, the doctrine of Ideas means that truth can really be known; all true Platonism guards the dualism between the Ideas and phenomena; and it finds a real teleology, a real purpose in things. "Creation is synonymous with the purposeful evocation of form out of the unformed, beauty out of ugliness, good out of potential evil, or more generally of order out of disorder" (*C.F.*, p. 221; *C.M.*, p. 20). It is thus preserved from the exaggerations of asceticism: Plato gives us a "solemn and almost sacramental adjuration at the close of the *Timæus*: 'One safeguard we have for the ills which assail us from two sides, that we should not exercise the soul without the body or

the body without the soul, in order that the twain may be in equipoise one against the other and in a state of health' " (*ibid.*). But Neoplatonism, under Aristotelian influence, blurred this dualism between Ideas and phenomena, accepting the Aristotelian conception of the Absolute, to which we have referred above.

Christianity inherited a conception of God as utterly distinct from the world; on this side, therefore, there was a natural congruity between genuine Platonism and Christianity, which found a noble expression in the Theological Orations of Gregory of Nazianzus. But Augustine, building more on Neoplatonism than on Plato himself, began to speak of a union of the soul with God; but this must not be exaggerated, for his "*donec requiescat in te* is still worlds apart from the dying sentence of his master Plotinus: 'To render back the divine in myself to the divine in the All' " (*C.F.*, p. 238; *C.M.*, p. 37). It was pseudo-Dionysius who gave to the thought of Plotinus a thin veneer of Christian respectability, and worked out the full conception of the *via negativa*. "The negative way, as its name implies, means . . . that by a successive surrender of all claims to know anything we attain at the last to the utmost knowing. Rather, it would say, ignorance is knowledge, darkness is light, by reason of the fact that in the absolute reality negation and affirmation are indistinguishable. . . . 'Unto this Darkness which is beyond Light we pray that we may come, and may attain unto vision through the loss of sight and knowledge, and that in ceasing thus to see or to know we may learn to know that which is beyond all perception and understanding' " (*C.F.*, p. 242; *C.M.*, p. 41).

The belief that the Dionysian writings were written by the companion of St. Paul helped to give them a great influence in the Middle Ages, especially from the twelfth century onwards. St. Bonaventura fixed the terminology for this new Mysticism. But what did these enthusiasts mean by the union of the soul with God? Are the two two or one? There is inconsistency; Ruysbroeck can say definitely that the union must be understood as one of love, not of essence or nature, and yet can speak of the "boundless love of God, who wishes to consume all loving spirits and swallow them up in Himself" (*C.F.*, p. 251 f; *C.M.*, p. 50 f.). And St. John of the Cross comes very near indeed to teaching an absorption of the soul into God. But "there is no place for ecstatic union with the living God of Abraham and of Isaac and Jacob, as Jesus defined the Father; it is possible only in that dark abyss of the Absolute, first opened to the Christian world by Dionysius" (*C.F.*, p. 259; *C.M.*, p. 58).

Plato had found a real presence of the Idea of Beauty in the things of sense, and so prepared the way for Christian sacramentalism. But in St. John of the Cross, the Night of the Senses means the renunciation of all pleasure in sensible things whatsoever; the Night of the Spirit means the emptying out of all faith, all intellectual understanding; and the Night of the Soul means that the soul is "to lose itself in the absolute negation which is also absolute affirmation and in the infinite darkness which is also infinite light" (*C.F.*, p. 271; *C.M.*, p. 70). This is not Christian Sacramentalism. "The temptation of the mystic is always to withdraw from the sacramental function of the Church into an inner, and, as he thinks, more spiritual habit of unmediated communion with the Deity" (*C.F.*, p. 282; *C.M.*, p. 80); and if there can be no question of St. John's intention to hold fast both to the Incarnation and the Sacraments, his loyalty was in despite of rather than because of his mystical theology. But to see the conclusions of nihilism in their unabashed nakedness we must turn to the bolder school of the North; Eckhart can say, "Consider, I pray you, by the eternal and imperishable truth and by my soul; grasp the ineffable secret. God and Godhead are separated as are heaven and earth. The heaven stands well a thousand miles higher. And so the Godhead above God. God becomes and unbecomes (*wird und entwird*)" (*C.F.*, p. 283; *C.M.*, p. 82).

Here, then, is Dr. More's answer. So long as the mystical temper retains its hold on the radical dualism between God and man, it is fruitful for good. But "absolute mysticism," whether on Christian or pagan soil, is a disease of religion, not its perfection; it is the handiwork of the Demon of the Absolute, a temptation to the reason just as surely as a surrender in the opposite direction is a temptation of the flesh (*C.F.*, p. 297; *C.M.*, p. 95 f.). It is a temptation that can only come to the noblest natures; it is a seeking that God's will may be done, but with the neglect of the all-important words "*on earth, as it is in heaven.*"

We have given an account of Dr. More's study of Mysticism at some length, because we believe that his critique is of great value at a time when a great deal of nonsense is being talked about Mysticism, and it is widely assumed that Mysticism is the highest fruit of Christianity. Thus he quotes Miss Underhill as describing mystics simply "as people who see and experience more vividly a Reality which is there for all of us" (*C.F.*, p. 286; *C.M.*, p. 84 note). This may, as he says, be true enough of a devotional work like Hilton's *Scale of Perfection*; but it is not true of Mysticism proper, which is in fact common to many religions, and in its "absolute" form is contrary to Christianity.

It is a great delight to come across Dr. More's noble Platonism, with his splendid teaching on the reality of Good and Truth, and his correlation of the Platonic teaching with sacramentalism. Though we only know in part, we do know. Yet one meets throughout his work phrases that offend; and one asks whether his Platonism does not lead him to over-intellectualize his conception of truth. There is genuine Platonism in the conception of "Hebrews," that the *reality* of Priesthood and Sacrifice, imperfectly expressed in the Aaronic system (see Heb. viii. 5, ix. 23), has itself descended to earth in the person of Jesus, as though in Him the Idea itself had taken flesh. That is to say, Revelation consists not in a *doctrine* which partakes of real truth, but in the manifestation of the Truth itself, in the form of man, in the Incarnation and the Redemption. But Dr. More does not, in this book at least, deal directly with the Incarnation; and his treatment of the Creed suffers from the fact that he ignores the vital distinction between belief *that* (certain doctrines are true) and faith *in* (=allegiance to, trust in, response to, God manifested in Christ). Surely the fulfilment of Platonism in Christianity is that in Christ the Idea itself has descended to earth.

A. G. HEBERT, S.S.M.

THE JESUITS AND THE GREAT MOGUL. By Sir Edward Maclagan. Burns Oates and Washbourne. 17s. 6d.

The traveller, the old Indian official or soldier who has spent long days of leisure in Delhi, Agra, and Fatehpur Sikri will read Sir Edward Maclagan's book with delight. To the romantic story of the Jesuit Mission to the Court of the Moguls the author brings an equipment formed by an intimate acquaintance with Northern India, with its languages and customs, reinforced by familiarity with the Latin, Portuguese, and Spanish tongues which the missionaries read and spoke. The book is written with a fine critical instinct. It begins with a lengthy account of the sources, many of them unpublished, and ends with a full bibliography and index. But its scientific character does not bedim the charm of Sir Edward's writing, and they who have worked in India will live over again those splendid days as they read his pages, a little wistfully perhaps, since separation and time have caused them to forget the annoyances of the climate which then created a yearning for home.

No student of Christian missions or of Indian history can afford to miss this book, for much that is not available elsewhere is here described. It is a lively, romantic story. At the be-

ginning of the sixteenth century the island of Goa became the Portuguese base for India, and from there the southern mainland was evangelized at strategic points by persuasion and sometimes by force. But when you explore Southern India today you do not remember most vividly the splendid relics of Portuguese Christianity at San Thomé or Madura, but the little parish churches and graveyards, built of red brick, along the road from Madras to Trichinopoly, hoary with age, like the village churches of England, and redolent with the same spirit of devotion and labour, indicating a gaze fixed upon futurity, building for generations yet unborn.

All this began in 1510. Meanwhile within a generation at two extremes of the world, at Rome and in Central Asia beyond the Himalayas, forces were in operation destined to stage the scene for an even more romantic mission in Northern India. In 1526 the Mogul invasion overthrew the Hindu power in the north, and established a Muhammedan dynasty. In 1540 the Company of Jesus received its charter from Paul III., and two years later Francis Xavier landed in South India. The consolidator of the Mogul power was Akbar, who ascended the Mogul throne two years before Queen Elizabeth, and died two years after her. He established a line of monarchs who were far from being fanatical Muslims, and when from Goa the first Jesuit mission appeared at his Court in 1580, he welcomed them, lodged them in the palace, sanctioned their missionary work, and supported it from the royal purse. Two other Jesuit missions arrived from the South in 1591 and 1595, but for the graphic story of Acquaviva, Jerome Xavier, and their assistants the reader must turn to the pages of Sir Edward Maclagan's graphic book. The story includes the embassy of Sir Thomas Roe—one of whose descendants is an honorary Diocesan Reader in the London Diocese—the envoy of James I., in the time of Jahangir; it includes the reign of Shah Jahan, who built the lovely Taj Mahal; it gives an account of the extraordinary Portuguese lady Donna Juliana, who died in 1734, of the curious family of Indian Bourbons, and a host of other interesting personalities.

Until the death of Juliana the Jesuits always hoped to convert the King and the royal household. From the beginning that had been their policy, following the course of the Roman missionaries in Saxon England and Meroving Gaul. But they did not get farther than the conversion of a courtier or two like Mirza Zu'lquarnaim. Persecution began under Shah Jahan (1627-58), and in the time of his successor Aurangzeb conversions almost entirely ceased, even among the poorer people. In the middle of the eighteenth century Nadir Shah of Persia

burst into India and sacked Delhi. In 1759 the Jesuits were expelled from Portugal, from France in 1764, and they were suppressed by Clement XIV. in 1774. Goa ceased to be the Jesuit headquarters of the East, and the Mogul Mission came to an end.

But its work survived and was carried on by Carmelites and Capuchins. We do not read of conversions by tens of thousands as in Japan. At Agra, Lahore, Delhi, and elsewhere there were small congregations, varying from three hundred to a thousand souls, attending well-equipped churches, living a life of regular and disciplined devotion, cared for by the Fathers, who found time also to leave permanent memorials to their work in linguistic and geographical studies, as well as impressing Christian influences upon the Mogul school of painting. They kept singularly free from guile and bribery and coercion, so frequently used by their brethren in the South. All their activities are described in this book, and some chapters are devoted to Church architecture and to the cemeteries which survive to this day.

The missionaries attempted to extend the faith to surrounding regions—for example, into Eastern Bengal, where the Augustinians opposed them; but their greatest effort of this kind was made in Tibet, and Sir Edward describes the gallant effort of Benedict de Goes and other Jesuits to discover Cathay, and to revive the Christian communities reported to be in existence in Tibet. From 1603 until 1721 the Jesuit missions to Tibet continued, and their successors, the Capuchins, held on there until about 1750.

He who has yet to visit Agra and Delhi, and above all Fatehpur Sikri, should first read this book. As the *jutka* takes him to the many points of interest in the plain around Delhi, between the old "New" Delhi and Lord Curzon's magnificent city; as he wanders around the pearl of architecture at Agra; above all, while he waits for lunch in the splendid *dak* bungalow at Fatehpur, he will find his thoughts not only returning to Akbar and Shah Jahan and Nadir Shah, but to the gallant soldiers of Christ of the Order of Jesus, who wove the history and civilization of the West into the life of Northern India, as effectively, though on a smaller scale, as the British Raj itself. In 1803 died Father Wendel, the last ex-Jesuit member of the Mogul Mission, and in that year the Mogul dynasty was brought to an end by the capture of Delhi by the British.

A. J. MACDONALD.

NOTICES

EROS AND CARITAS: PLATONIC LOVE AND LOVE IN THE CHRISTIAN SENSE.
By Dr. H. Scholz, Professor of Philosophy in the University of
Münster (Westphalia). Pp. vii, 120. Max Niemeyer Verlag,
Halle. 1929.

Dr. Scholz has published (in German) a brief but suggestive study of Platonic and Christian love. The first part is based on Plato's *Symposium* and Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, and the second is derived not only from the New Testament, but also from St. Augustine's *Confessions*, the *Pensées* of Pascal, and Dante's *Divina Commedia*. The subject is treated at times in highly scientific and metaphysical language, but the main outlines are clearly drawn for those who are able and willing to follow the author's closely reasoned argument.

First of all, Platonic love is a definite disposition of mind, which has three qualities:

- (1) It presupposes a definite idea or *eidos* of the beautiful.
- (2) It consists in being attracted by the *eidos* of the beautiful.
- (3) It can be created only in a man.

The *eidos* of the beautiful belongs to the class of forms invisible to the senses, and manifests itself in men, either youths or boys, but also in all beautiful things. We understand by the attractive power of the *eidos* of the beautiful that, if a man has once beheld the *eidos* of the beautiful, he is radically changed and strives ceaselessly after this idea. But only a man can do this: women are excluded from the exercise of this love, because they are inferior.

The extension of Platonic love to the elements of the cosmos is the necessary condition for obtaining the world-power, to which this love is raised by Aristotle.

Professor Scholz distinguishes the physical bodies, and the heavenly bodies which have "souls"—i.e., which carry out their movements with a wonderful "reasonableness." They follow various laws of motion, and pass from one form of existence to a higher and different form. The world-order is determined by the periodic movements of the sun and the fixed stars, and by the seasonal change and decay of organic nature. But the motive power, which is required for the movement of the starry heaven, is *θεωρία* or thought. The world-order can only be made intelligible through the existence of a highest being, which is God. How does God move the starry heaven? Aristotle answers, *Κιτεῖ ὡς ἐρώμενον*. So Platonic love becomes a world-power in the *Metaphysics* of Aristotle, because the existence of this love is a necessary condition for the existence of the physical world-order and its preservation.

Prof. Scholz proceeds now to compare Platonic love with Christian love or Caritas. Both of them are mental dispositions, which, in general, make life worth living. This love exists truly in God, and is a temper of mind, which can only be predicated of God. It gives everything, and so is fully manifested in the Incarnation.

Caritas consists in the noble imitation of the love, which has its pattern in God. There is no human love which does not go out from a love of God, which is created by God's love. This is characterized by an unlimited readiness for lowering of existence—that is, self-humiliation.

The second common quality of Platonic Eros and Christian Caritas is the aim, by which both these forms are determined. But while Platonic

love strives upward from below, Caritas comes down from above. The finest examples of this saving, helping love are the Good Samaritan and the father of the Prodigal Son.

The last criterion of Caritas is, that it is not limited to the sphere of man, but its finest and tenderest manifestations exist only in women. Prof. Scholz directs our attention to three supreme figures: first of all the Virgin Mary, and after her St. Elizabeth and Dante's Beatrice.

Dante has given incomparable expression of his pure love for Beatrice in his *Inferno*, and still more in his *Paradiso*. In the concluding lines of the latter poem, *l'amor che move il sole e l'altre stelle* is not the Platonic love, but rather Caritas. It is God's love, which is thought of as the last motive of the creation of the world. In other words, God has created the world for this reason, to build up a kingdom, in which His love can work itself out. Such a motive for creation would be absurd for Aristotle, but it is the starting point of the Christian faith.

L. PATTERSON.

BOOK NOTES

Anglo-Catholic Ideals. By K. D. Mackenzie. S.C.M. 3s. 6d. So much has been written on the subject that a new book might seem superfluous. But Mr. Mackenzie is so disarming in his frankness, so urbane in manner, so scholarly and well-informed generally, that this exposition has a place of its own. Designed primarily for those without, it will be useful to those within in suggesting lines of explanation and apologetic.

W. K. L. C.

Saint Augustine. By Heinrich Hubert Lesaar. Translated from the German by T. Pope Arkell. Burns Oates and Washbourne, Ltd. 6s. The most commendable quality of this work is its plan and general arrangement, giving an orderly and proportioned narrative of St. Augustine's life. Nothing else is up to the same level. The style is colourless and rather heavy, and the translator has faithfully given us the irritating rhetorical questions and exclamations of the original. The tone is didactic, and afraid of leaving the obvious unsaid, and there is no real critical estimate. A work of edification rather than a study. But it might be worse.

V. I. R.

The Blossoming of the Desert. A Peep into the Fruitful Way of Renunciation. By the author of *Some Mysteries of the Incarnate Life*. A. R. Mowbray. 1s. 6d. A Publishers' Note states that "the Author believes that if the meaning and purpose of the Religious state were more clearly taught, there would be a revival of spiritual life throughout the whole Anglican Communion, and in this little book he tries to show something of the romance and courage of monasticism." Many think that the author is right in his belief, and will be very grateful to him for his graceful and lucid picture of the religious life. This little book should be of great use to busy priests who desire to teach their people about the life of the counsels, and to those who are conscious of a religious vocation, but have little knowledge of what that life really is.

Aids to the Life of Prayer. By Francis Underhill. Mowbray. 1s. 6d. This is a collection of rather disconnected papers which, though not very profound, will doubtless be helpful to many. The chapters on Suffering and Answers to Prayer are particularly good, those on Peace of Mind and the Beauty of the External World rather superficial; the latter particu-

larly suffers from the author's apparent inability to grasp the real value of the view he criticizes.

Reasoned Prayers for the Lord's own Service. By the Rev. A. K. Bostock. Longmans. 3s. 6d. As its title indicates, this book is an attempt to provide for Anglicans a book of prayers similar to Fr. Roche's admirable *Mysteries of the Mass in Reasoned Prayers*. We believe that Fr. Roche's book is still the better of the two, and those who know and love it will be unlikely to want anything else; nevertheless, those who prefer to use an Anglican book will find here a valuable collection of affective prayers for use at the Sacred Mysteries.

The Stations of the Cross. Suggestions for Meditation for Public or Private Use. By the Rev. C. P. Hankey, M.A. Mowbray. 6d. This little book consists of six sets of suggestions for meditation on the Stations, together with a variety of prayers and acts. It provides just what is so often wanted by clergy whose privilege it is to conduct this devotion, as well as by the laity who use it privately; and can be heartily recommended.

F. P. H.

The Challenge of Karl Barth. A critical comment. By Carl Heath. H. R. Allenson. 1s. This "critical comment" is strikingly provocative of thought in that it brings into juxtaposition the Quaker emphasis upon the Inner Light and the Barthian affirmation that "There is no continuity between the activity of God and our activity." The quotations on page 25 dealing with Brunner's exposition of the Barthian position with reference to the Incarnation, and the illustrations of the wreck and the bud on page 29, are both challenges to thought; whilst the constructive criticism of each position (pp. 34-37 and 39-41) shows how extremes can meet in a challenge to practical Christianity in what Karl Barth describes as "The patient work of reform."

E. F.

The Cowley Calendar. A. R. Mowbray. 2s. 6d. Selections from largely unpublished teaching of Father Benson arranged as a permanent Calendar. Pithy, clear-cut sayings of a master of the spiritual life.

M. D. R. W.

Schopenhauer. By Helen Zimmern. Allen and Unwin. 7s. 6d. This, which is based on an earlier version issued in 1876, will be esteemed for its merit as a biography. It presents a lively picture of the trials and labours, more prominent as these are than joys and satisfactions, of an original but thwarted genius. If, as the authoress maintains, all those who grant a certain primacy to the Will should regard themselves as followers of Schopenhauer, his distinctive pessimism does not count for much, and his main problem is left where it was. Let it suffice that he should preserve us from any facile monism and disclose the magnitude of the actual problem of the spiritual life. For the "measure of a man" we must look elsewhere.

The Atonement in Experience. By Leon Arpee. Allen and Unwin. 5s. The writer finds the ultimate secret of the Atonement in an act of Christ's proper deity, and criticizes some of the main types of theory on this ground. For his own position he finds support in Aulén's *Christus Victor* (S.P.C.K.), and he works out the implications of his thesis with considerable acumen, producing a book which may be read with profit.

F. W. B.